Chapter 12

The Church and the State
after National Liberation


Recently in Korean society, various levels of coordination and dissent have existed in the relationship between the Church and State. Although the basis for the relationship is nominally provided for in the Constitution, the constitutional basis for Church-State relations is not clearly and specifically defined in elaborate terms in either cooperative or confronting situations.1

On one hand, the function of the State has expanded so much as to greatly affect not only the people’s political life but also the economic, social and cultural dimensions of their lives as well. At the same time, the concept of the mission of the Church has expanded to include not only the personal, spiritual realm but also the social and worldly realms. In addition, the present Korean church has grown both in volume and organization to assume an important role in Korean society. Its influence has also grown accordingly with its increased status. Considering the growth rate of the Korean church since 1945, one can acknowledge the increase of the relative importance of the Church, at least in its size.

Table 1: Quantitative Growth of the Korean Church
Year No. of Believers No. of Churches No. of Clergy
1940 372,400 5,497 4,304
1950 839,711    
1960 1,190,000    
1970 2,200,000    
1975 4,019,313 16,089 22,483
1980 7,180,627    
Data: Comprehensive Survey of the 100 Years of the Korean Church (Korean Christian Social Studies Research Institute, 1982) and additional information.

As of 1985, the Korean church had more than 10 million Protestant and Catholic believers. (See the table on the preceding page.) This is the equivalent of 25%2 of the whole population of 40 million people in south Korea. In some respects, Christians may pose various problems in Korean society, but Christians are a strong organization with strong spiritual and religious discipline. Therefore, Christianity will be able to contribute to the development of national society when the relationship between the Church and the State is properly established.

I. Historical Background

In looking back at the 100 years of the Christian movement in Korea, we recognize complex and perilous interactions between the Christian movement and the power of the State. When the Protestant missionary H. N. Allen came to Korea in 1884 as a doctor for the American legation, the state power of the Chosun Dynasty was still oppressing the Catholics on the basis of On Repulsion of Evil Western Religion,3 and the 1882 Korean-American Friendship Treaty excluded a religious clause permitting religious propagation. Even after a religious clause was included in the treaty with the French,4 a hostile attitude toward Christianity was still sometimes displayed.

The Independence Society Movement, created to promote renovation of the state power structure, was the first active participation by the Christian movement in national affairs. The participation of Christians led the people to claim their civil rights and to seek a constitutional government. The missionaries understood this as a positive result of their mission activities.5 After the national crisis created by the agreement in 1905 to make Korea a Japanese protectorate, the Korean church faced the serious dilemma of either maintaining a neutral attitude under the guidance of the missionaries or of joining the resistance movement. As the missionaries’ opinion eventually prevailed, the nationalist Christians in large numbers joined secret organizations, like the New People’s Society.6

Since the Education Ordinance was issued in 1910, Christian private schools were accused of violating the Japanese colonial education policies. The schools as a result had to suffer through a series of repressive administrative acts, such as bans on Bible studies and prayer services. These measures were presumably taken to control and suppress the effects of patriotic education in the Christian private schools.7

It is a well-known fact that the Korean Christian movement participated in the March 1 Independence Movement of 1919 and that, as the popular Messianic religion, Christianity wholeheartedly challenged, along with Chondogyo and Buddhism, the legitimacy of Japanese power and authority as is well validated by their participation and numerical strength in Pyongyang and Sonchon.8 Later in the 1930s, Christians found that they had to face the choice of betrayal to the Church or martyrdom when the Japanese imperial government forced Korean Christians to worship Shinto.9

The historical background above shows that the Korean Christian movement did not always enjoy an amicable relationship with the political powers of the State. From a historical point of view, this dissent derives from the fact that the political power was that of imperial colonialism while the Korean Christian movement was closely related with the nationalistic movement. It can be concluded that church history was, therefore, beset with adversities because the church movement, as a prophetic religious movement, confronted the injustice and atrocities of the political power.

II. The Post-Liberation Development of State Power and the Christian Movement

A. The Resumption of the Christian Movement and Controversy over Shinto Worship

The ultimate goals of the Korean Christian movement after national liberation, it can be said, were recovery of its religious conscience that had been deprived by Shinto worship, penitence of the clergy and reconstruction of the Church. On September 20, 1945, the Christians who were released by the Japanese from imprisonment gathered together at Changdaehyon Church in Pyongyang to establish five principles for reconstruction of the Korean church; and at the meeting of 200 clergy members of Pyonganpukto held at Koktong Church on November 14 of the same year, a similar event took place as Dr. Pak Hyong- ryong, the dean of Fengtien Seminary in Manchuria, declared five principles for the reconstruction of the Korean church. The five principles were:

• First, since all the church leaders participated in Shinto worship, they have to purify themselves through penitence before engaging in church activities.

• Second, penitence will be performed in the form of self-discipline or repentance, and ministers will go through at least two months of penitence and confession.

• Third, when ministers and presbyters are not officiating, deacons or ordinary believers will lead prayer services.

• Fourth, the basic principles for church reconstruction must be delivered all over the country so that they can be practiced simultaneously.

• Fifth, seminaries should be restored and reconstructed to train clergy people.’10

It is true that these principles appealed to the churches throughout the country, but some Shinto worshipers were against them. Minister Hong Taek-ki, the chairman of the 27th Presbyterian General Assembly that resolved the Shinto worship issue, declared, "Those who struggled to preserve the Church suffered as much as the ones who suffered in prison, and the efforts of the people who had to surrender to Japanese oppression while carrying out the responsibilities of the Church on their shoulders should be respected more than those who fled overseas, deserting the Church, or who went into hibernation."11

In spite of the fact that all of the churches accepted the principles for church reconstruction and the claims of the Christians released from prison,’2 the released Christians failed to establish a leading role in the Korean Christian movement, and thus, the leadership of Korean Christianity was assumed by those who surrendered to and cooperated with Japanese imperialism and Shinto worship. Consequently, the released Christians were alienated from the leadership of the Korean Christian movement. Therefore, penitence and purification of the Korean Christian movement could not be carried out thoroughly.

The special law for punishment of anti-national activities that passed the National Assembly on September 7,1948, and was proclaimed on September 22 caused a stir in the Korean Christian community as it did among the wider Korean society.

In March of the following year, the arrests began. On March 10, 1949, Minister Chon P. S., a Christian leader, was arrested as an anti-national, pro-Japanese activist; Bishop Chong C. S. of the Methodist Church was arrested on March 12; Minister Kim I. S. on March 14; Minister Yang J. S. of the Methodist Church and Minister Chong I. K. of the Presbyterian Church in Korea on March 28; and in Pusan, Minister Kim K. C. was arrested on April 2.13 These arrests well demonstrate that the Korean Christian movement had the insurmountable task of overcoming the humiliation and shame of pro-Japanese inclinations and Shinto worship. One can guess that this phenomenon might have functioned as the seed for the "symbiosis of politics and religion" between the Church and Syngman Rhee’s political regime that followed.

Although the movement against Shinto worship ended with inner conflict and a split within the Church after national liberation, it nonetheless established the trai:lition of sensitive resistance by people of faith against the abuse of state power.

For example, when the principal of a primary school in Kyonggi Province expelled several pupils among the school’s 43 Christian students who refused to bow to the national flag on April 28, 1949, sharp reaction took place among the churches. The Korean Christian Council succeeded in persuading President Syngman Rhee to grant a petition to substitute a bow to the national flag with "observation at attention" on May 11, 1949. This was followed by a campaign to oppose idolization of the flag until a special committee was organized on October 20, 1949, to investigate the anti-Christian attitudes in the policies of Education Minister An Ho-sang.14

Church involvement in the life of the nation was also reflected in Christian opposition to the erection of Tangun’s statute in February 196615 and again in its opposition against the construction of the Tangun temple in February 1970 through such activities as the Christian Mass Assembly, which was held at the Students Hall in Kwangju on February 14, 1970, an event attended by 70 church leaders and 1,000 representatives of the lay people. This sensitive reaction could have been caused by the painful experience of Shinto worship.16

This opposition to Shinto worship, that is, denouncement of the diminution of political power, was further expressed in the Church’s declaration opposing reconstruction of Yaskuni Zinza.17 This was a continuation of opposition to the resurrection of emperor worship left over from the Japanese militarism of the past. This attitude proves that the Church opposed the deification of the emperor, for it considered Shinto worship not merely a religious issue but a political matter as well.18

The Rev. Kim Chae-choon pointed out that the Nationalization Bill for Japan’s Yaskuni Zinza and the Korean Church19 was: (1) justification of the war; (2) resurrection of militarism; and (3) cunning infringement on the freedom of religion. He warned that sanctification of Hyonchungsa or the "Patrialitic Temple" should not become an act of deification.

B. The Resistance of North Korean Christians against Communist Political Power

At the time of national liberation in 1945, there existed 300,000 to 350,000 Christians and about 2,000 churches in north Korea.20 The political power of the Communists under Kim Il-sung, aware of the influence and strength of the Christian movement, attempted to utilize it but failed. This led to oppression against Christians by the Communists through land reformation,21 interference in the life of congregations and forcing people to join the Christian Federation, a pro- communist organization. Nominally they pretended to allow freedom of religion and prayer services. In reality, however, they persecuted the Christians as reactionaries; and in the 1972 Constitution, they openly justified the anti-religious propaganda that they had been carrying out.

i. The Changdaehyon Church Incident in Pyongyang

In 1946, Kim Il-sung’s People’s Committee tried to ban and deter the prayer service commemorating the March 1 Independence Movement at Changdaehyon Church in Pyongyang that was held separately by Christians under the officiation of Minister Kil Son-ju. who was one of the nation’s representatives of the independence movement. Although many of the clergy were arrested, about 5,000 Christians gathered in spite of this harassment at Changdaehyon Church on March 1, 1946, for the commemorative prayer service. When the authorities tried to take Minister Hwang Un-gyun of Changdong Church while he was conducting a prayer after his sermon, the site for the commemorative service turned to chaos. The Christians marched down the streets holding the national flag and crosses to protest this infringement of their "freedom of religion." Many ministers and lay people who held an overnight hunger strike at Changdaehyon Church were arrested by the authorities. A similar incident also took place at the East Church in Siniju22 This March 1 commemorative service showed quite apparent inclinations toward anti-U.S.S.R., anti- trusteeship and anti-communist stands.

ii. Sunday Election23

The north Korean regime of Kim Il-sung named the Sunday of November 3, 1946, as election day for the "people’s committees of provinces, cities and counties of North Chosun." This decision revealed the underlying intentions of the north Korean Communist Party, which were to determine the Church’s reaction and to undermine the Church in order to cause inner conflicts. The north Korean church delivered their resolution of protest to the north Korean regime on October 20. The five clauses of the resolution included the principles of the church agreements and guidelines for religious life. The five clauses were:

• The Church that considers the Sabbath its life will not participate in any activities except religious services.

• Politics and religion should be distinctly separated.

• Securing and maintaining sanctity is the natural obligation and right of the Church. A church is not to be used for any other occasion except religious services.

• When active clergy members are engaged in political activities, they are prohibited from using the churches.

• The Church will secure freedom of faith and assembly.24

The separation of politics from religion as reflected in this resolution was an attempt to impede the interference and oppression of Christianity by the north Korean regime. At the same time, it was a declaration of abstention from participation in the election. The Christian Federation’s claim to participate in the election, on the other hand, was an attempt to disrupt the Church. North Korean Christians, however, did not participate in the November 3 election at the risk of martyrdom. Consequently, the north Korean church suffered from various investigations, interference and revenge from the north Korean regime.

iii. Confiscation of Tokwon Monastery

The north Korean communist regime schemed and plotted for Christianity’s self-destruction through the surveillance of Catholics, interference in the assembly of Christians at church meetings, interrogation of ministers and priests, discrimination against Christian children and coercion against the clergy and their sermons - in general, disruption of the Church. They further oppressed Christians by means of infamously branding them as "reactionaries" who were plotting "subversion of the government."

In December 1948, the north Korean communist regime arrested the Rev. Om (whose first name is unknown), who was in charge of the financial affairs of Tokwon Monastery, and Brother Pae (whose first name is also unknown) for their "political crimes." On May 8 of the following year, four priests were arrested of whom three were Germans: Bishop B. Sauer, Father Superior L. Ruth and the Rev. A. Schleicher, an assistant to the father superior. Two days later 99 Korean theological students and brothers were expelled, and the monastery was confiscated. The political crimes committed by the monastery: "reactionary assemblies were held in the monastery; leaflets for a schemed riot were printed in coordination with the South; a radio communication system and explosives to be used for the riot were hidden in the monastery cellar; and bootlegging and anti-communist education were conducted within the perimeter of the monastery."25 Unlike the Protestant churches, the Catholics used to avoid political activities, even in the days of Japanese colonialism, but they had to suffer from this distressing oppression nonetheless.

Later Wonsan Convent, Singosan Convent, Hamhung Convent and the Cathedral were confiscated, and more than 30 German priests and nuns were arrested. It is known that more than 20 Germans were martyred. Bishop Hong (whose first name is unknown), who filed a protest against these incidents, disappeared mysteriously, and many more priests were arrested.26 This was part of the overall policy of oppressing religion conducted by the north Korean communist regime.

iv. North Korean Communist Policies for Appeasement and Disruption

As noted above, the north Korean communist regime formed a pro-government Christian organization called the Christian Federation.27 This organization was formed under the leadership of Kang Yang-uk, maternal kin of Kim Il-sung who had graduated from Pyongyang Theological Seminary and who had worked as a minister immediately before and after liberation. Christian leaders were individually persuaded and coaxed into joining the federation. Prior to the Korean War, the Christian Federation controlled all of the churches and Christian schools in the country, and any clergy members opposing the federation were imprisoned.28 This organization listed the following points in their statement about the November 3 election:

• We fully support the Kim Il-sung government.

• We do not recognize the south Korean regime.

• The Church vows to lead the people.

• Therefore, the Church participates in the election on its own initiative.

This position was contrary to the resolution to oppose the election announced by the Federation of the Five Provinces.

The north Korean church had to resist the domination and abuses described above. First, the Christians confronted them by participating in party activities. The Chosun Democratic Party was activated at the end of 1945 under the leadership of Cho Man- sik and presbyter 0 Yun-son. Half a million people joined the party in three months after activation, and Christian leaders prevailed upon the leading strata of the local organizations. The Chosun Democratic Party, however, began to deteriorate through oppression and infiltration caused by its opposition to the five-year trusteeship recommended by the conference of three leaders in Moscow; it was difficult for them to confront the Kim Il-sung regime supported by Soviet military power.

In addition to the Chosun Democratic Party, the Christian Socialist Democratic Party under the leadership of Yun Ha-yong and Minister Han Kyongjik and the Chiistian Liberal Party about to be activated by Minister Kim Hwa-sik and others in Pyongyang tried to confront the power of the Communists, but their challenge was meager. However, the Christian movement participated, overtly and covertly, in the dissident activities against the north Korean communist regime. Their activities are described below.

v. The Student Movement and Christianity

In Siniju, several thousand students held a demonstration to protest against the Pyongbuk People’s Committee, the Pyongbuk Communist Party and the Siniju Security Bureau for oppressing the Church. The Communists opened fire indiscriminately, killing more than 20 people and injuring more than 300. This incident, however, was first ignited in Yongampo where violence raged as the workers of Yongampo Light Metals Factory, under the instigation of the Communists, attacked the convention site where the Yongampo branch of the Socialist Democratic Party was inaugurated on November 16, 1945. The middle and high school students tried to stop them, and eventually a violent clash ensued. The riot was subdued with a large number of people injured, and its effects later reached Siiju. Many Christians participated in this incident, and the Church had to pay a terrible price as a result.29

Another large-scale demonstration took place several months later on March 13, 1946, in Hamhung.30 Chanting the slogan, "Guarantee the Freedom of Campus," students of Hungnam Industrial, Hamgung Agricultural, Hamnam Middle School and Yongsaeng Middle School held a demonstration with the local citizens. Again, the Christian movement participated in this demonstration at which six people were killed, 33 were seriously wounded and more than 2,000 were arrested. There was also an incident in Chongju at Osan School, which was a Christian school established by Koreans with their proud tradition represented by Yi Sung-hun and Cho Man-sik. When they imprisoned Chu Ki-yong, the schoolmaster, and communized Osan School, 1,300 students demonstrated, shouting, "Stop Communization of the School Immediately"; "Release the Arrested Students"; "Down with the Communist Party."31

In addition to these events, countless uprisings took place during this period after liberation: the Chosun Democratic Party incidents at Paekyang-myon, Cholsan-gun and Pyongan-pukto in September 1946 and the Anti-Communism Society incidents at Hwechon and Pyongan-pukto in February 1949.32 Thus, the Korean Christian movement went through tragedies continuously during and after the Korean War.

During the three years of war, all the churches in north Korea were either destroyed or turned into nurseries, child care centers, schools, theaters, court houses or lodging facilities, and the remaining members of the clergy and believers were slaughtered, missing or removed between June and October of 71950 with Christianity thus becoming actually non-existent.

It is impossible to record here all of the atrocities committed by the communist regime against Christians and the Church during the Korean War, but it is estimated that more than 50 members of the clergy were abducted and taken to the North, 408 clergy members were sacrificed during the war and 1,373 churches were burned down.33

These are the facts about the violent confrontation between the north Korean communist regime and the Korean Christian movement, which we need to understand before we can analyze the relationship between the north Korean communist regime and the Christian movement in theological or ideological terms. These facts made the Korean church a subjective anti-communist entity. The Church’s position derives from the historical experience through which the Korean Christian movement had endured.

III. The Syngman Rhee Regime and Christianity

The fact that the Syngman Rhee regime was close to pro-Japanese supporters and strongly anti-communist and the fact that Syngman Rhee himself was a Christian were factors that provided grounds for intimate relations between Christian leaders and the Rhee regime in south Korea. It will not be easy to concretely analyze the relationship between the Syngman Rhee regime and Korean Christianity, but several aspects that follow can be observed.

To begin, it should be noted that Minister Yi Yun-yong held a prayer service at the opening session of the first National Assembly where Dr. Syngman Rhee was elected as chairman on May 31, 1948, an honor of which Rhee was proud, and it is also significant that about 50 Christians were elected as National Assemblymen. C ristians were also impressed when President Syngman Rhee prayed to God in his inaugural speech on the foundation day of the Republic of Korea on August 15 of the same year.35

It should also be noted that when Sinuhwe, the fraternity of National Assemblymen, was organized on June 25, 1952, its leaders were predominantly from Syngman Rhee’s Liberal Party. At the time, 50 of the 210 National Assemblymen were Christians, and 39 Christian Assemblymen joined the fraternity, which purported to act as a coordination faculty in the House of Representatives. The fraternity’s staff were Yun Chae-gun, Kang Ky9ng-ok and Kim In-tae for general affairs; Pak Yongchul, So Sang-dok and Nam Song-hak for financial affairs; and Hwang Song-su, Yun Song-sun and Kwon Pyong-no for negotiations.36

Ties between the Syngman Rhee regime and the Korean Christian community were further strengthened in 1952 when the Korean Christian Election Campaign Committee was organized to support Syngman Rhee and Ham Tae-yong in the country’s election of its second president. To support these Christian candidates, campaign forces were mobilized on the provincial and county levels.37

Christians were also active in the National Assembly elections held on May 20, 1954. Before the election, the Christian community conducted a large-scale election campaign carrying profiles of Christian candidates in the Christian newspaper.38 There were some conflicts and criticism from the Christian community at this time, but about 20 Christians were voted into office among the 203 elected national representatives. The list of their names and affiliated party shows the strong relationship between the Liberal Party and Christians.39

This phenomenon, the Church’s inclination to support the pro- government faction, was repeated in ensuing elections. The Church was an active participant in the rigged election of March 15,1960, that was a fatal blow to democracy. Both candidates, Syngman Rhee for the presidency and Yi Kibung for the vice presidency, were Christians who pleaded for support from the Christian community in their "message to the 1.5 million Christians throughout the nation."~ This tendency to support pro-government politicians, especially those tainted by corruption, inevitably associated the misdemeanor of Christian politicians with that of the Church itself.41 This was blatantly proved by the wristwatch smuggling incident involving Hwang Song-su, the vice chairman of the National Assembly, and Rep. Pak

The close affiliation of the Liberal Party and the Church became a liability for the Church as the fall of the Liberal Party brought a serious crisis to the Church too. The Korean Christianity that was liberated from Japanese colonialism did not possess the capabilities to solve the national task of eliminating the aftereffects of colonialism nor was it capable of facing and handling exterior challenges, such as harassment by the special investigation committee to root out anti- nationalistic activists. The Church’s opposition to the north Korean communist regime led to an easy affiliation with the anti- communist policies of Syngman Rhee’s government, but this ideological alignment with the nation’s political power hampered the establishment of a sound relationship between the State and the Church. Helpless in the turmoil of corruption and irregularities, the Church turned oblivious of its own prophetic mission.

However, not all of the Korean church was a Babylonian captive of the Syngman Rhee regime.~ Immediately after Dr. Syngman Rhee took office during his first term as president, church leaders and Christian members of the Constitutional Assembly visited the president to make their recommendations, one of which was a request for regular interviews between the president and the church leaders, but Syngman Rhee gave no reply. Most of the disappointed church leaders, except a few flatterers, turned phlegmatic to the president. However, the government did not interfere in general with the Church’s religious activities. This explains why the Church tried to refrain from intruding in the political realm, although they were displeased by Syngman Rhee’s betrayal.44

One should not presuppose though that the Liberal Party and the Church were affiliated in a mutually reinforcing relationship to the degree that is often believed. On the contrary, a majority of the Church was in grievous resentment and disappointment about the whole situation. In spite of this though, one cannot justify the attitude displayed by much of the Korean church, for the Korean church at this time was either flattering the powerful and riding on their power, detached from the populace of the nation, or it was indulging in religious factionalism struggling to secure the leadership of the Christian community. In a way, however, "it was not that the Church discarded the peo~~le, but the people and history did not expect anything from the Church." As a result, the Korean church found itself loaded with a burden; it had to overcome the adversity it had created for itself, that is, the Church had to answer to the mission given to it by the nation’s history by mobilizing its potential as well as simultaneously resolving resentment in the minds of the people.

IV. The Relationship of the Church and the State in the 1960s:

The April19 Student Revolution and Self-Criticism of the Church

The Korean church had to undergo a staggering review of itself because of the impact of the April 19 Student Revolution in 1960, for the Syngman Rhee regime, with which the Church had identified, collapsed under the weight of the bloody struggle of the students.

Chang Ha-gu of Hyangrin Church reflects on the plight of the Church immediately after the revolution:

"The Church that once had been the advocate of the revolutionary spirit of the people somehow had aged. Unaware of the new day breaking, the Church did not understand what it meant when there was a crashing noise outside. The Church finally opened its eyes when they howled outside the door that a new morning had come. It opened its eyes but was displeased: displeased because somebody made such a big noise to disturb its sweet sleep.

"The nation has achieved a revolution, fighting against tyranny, and all the mass media eulogize the spirit of the revolution. But the Church is still confused. The Christian newspaper, which used to be so eloquen4 until the eve of the revolution, has suddenly turned silent."

Thus, Minister Chang Ha-gu sharply criticized the Church for maintaining such a close relationship with the Rhee regime. The Church’s self-criticism, however, was not universal. For instance, the statement by the youth group of Seamunan Church urging the Church to awake caused a controversy.47 With the passing of time, however, the revolution apparently offered an opportunity for the Church to reflect upon itself. Minister Changgong Kim Chae-jun observed at the time:

"The April 19 Revolution was a flashing light piercing out through the dark clouds. The highly moral act spotlighted the true aspect of the conscience of the people, and the Church also was able to see itself in that light. Some Christians began to lament that the Church was wholly responsible for the evil doings of the collapsed regime, and many church or~nizations confessed their own misdemeanors to the public."48

Minister Changgong Kim Chae-jun further reflected on the basic relationship between the State and the Church as well as the past affiliation of politics and religion promoted by the Church:

"The Church should not identify itself with the State in power nor should it attempt to use the power [of the State] for the benefits of the Church. ...It is subject to the criticism that the Church failed to give any proper warning when the State showed the tendency of becoming a dictatorial tyranny, that the Church indulged in the seeds of identification with the State and that the Church was not active for more constructive works."49

This type of self-criticism provided a turning point in the relationship between the State and the Korean church.

V. The Regime of the Republican Party and Church Participation

A. The May 16 Military Revolution and the Church

With the May 16 military coup in 1961, Korean Christianity could not help but face a neiM political phase. Christians had had significant influence in the regimes of Syngman Rhee and John M. Chang, but the Church now had to confront a new political reality because Gen. Park Chung-hee was not a Christian and because he seized power by means of a "military revolution."

Chairman Park Chung-hee of the Supreme Council held a formal meeting with religious leaders in May 1961. The Christian churches, however, did not make any particular demands on him, but rather they urged the general establishment of a state of freedom and democracy in their open letter on March 26, 1961, to the chairman, who was expected to transfer power to a civilian government. This was necessitated because Chairman Park, who had made the commitment of transferring power to a civilian government in his "February 27 Oath," suddenly changed his attitude in his "March 16 Statement."

On May 29, 1961, the Council of the Korean Christian Churches delivered a careful statement, saying, "We consider that this May 16 military revolution was an inevitable measure to save the country from a military invasion as well as from corruption and decline. ...We hope a democratic government to succeed this spirit of the revolution will be established in the near future to fulfill the revolution’s commitment for providing a new beginning in the history of this country and thus promoting faster democratic reunification of the nation."

In the open letter, the Council of Korean Christian Churches said:

"...It also has been proven that extension of the concentration of power further increases temptation and reinforces the urge to seize more concentrated power rather than preparing for freedom and democracy. It is a fact that prolonging concentrated power causes corruption that will intensify faster and deeper in covert politics than in open politics as shown in historic examples.

"...Political demonstrations and public statements concerning political participation by armed military personnel on active duty, we believe, will cause anxiety among the people, and...we are sure that was not your true intention. We urge that the administration be quickly returned to the politicians, and the military be devoted to its fundamental duty of defending the country."

At the same time, the Council of the Korean Christian Churches urged solidification of free democracy in "The Open Letter to Politicians of the Country," pointing out the failures committed by members of the Liberal and Democratic parties. This statement is considered important because it was a cornerstone for the Korean Christian movement in preparing itself to defend democracy with a new awareness after the April 19 Revolution.

B. Ratification of the Korea-Japan Talks and the Church

The Korean church had been sharply criticizing itself in the aftermath of the April 19 Revolution and was carefully probing for ways to participate in the actual lives of the people. Seeking a new direction, the Church started making political statements and participating in the life of the whole church community when the nation found itself facing a crisis in the form of the humiliating Korea-Japan talks in 1964.

This movement is roughly divided into two phases: the first phase consisted of acts of protest that started in 1964 against the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan; the second phase was centered upon protest against ratification of the Korea-Japan Treaty in June

The first comment by the Korean church on the Korea-Japan talks was made by Christian students. On February 12,1964, when the Korea-Japan talks were first discussed, the Korean Student Christian Movement (KSCM) disclosed its attitude about the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan in their "Open Letter to the Japanese Christians," urging Japanese Christians’ conscientious and voluntary cooperation to promote proper normalization of the relations of the two countries.50

This open letter urged new awareness on the part of Japan, reminding the Japanese concretely of Japan’s aggressive acts during their 36 years of colonialism and the prosperity that the Japanese enjoyed in the shadow of the war in Korea. It also pointed out that arbitrarily shipping Korean residents in Japan to north Korea and the superior attitude that the Japanese were assuming at the normalization talks "prove that Japan has not yet shed off its past imperialistic traits of colonialism."

In spite of these facts, however, the Korean Christians made it clear that, following the Gospel’s understanding from Jesus Christ, "the Korean Christians would discard hatred and resentment against Japan that was deeply engraved in recent Korean history, hoping instead for progress based on good will for the sake of creating a new history." This open letter is notable because it was the first formal statement made by the Christian students on a matter of national interest as well as the first statement by the Christian community.

The Korean chui~h, however, did not organize or participate in any activities in this period of national turmoil until martial law was declared on June 3 following the organization of the Nationwide Campaign To Oppose the Humiliating Diplomacy with Japan by about 200 leaders in various fields and political parties on March 6, 1964, and the infuriated protests throughout the country against the negotiations after demonstrations by the students of Seoul National, Yonsei and Korea universities. Except for the open letter by the Christian students, nothing notable happened but the activities of the Christian Mothers Association to save the students during the June 3 incident. The Christian Mothers Association conducted a petition campaign to win the release of the arrested students and collected funds for the arrested students and their families. The position of the Christian mothers was clear: "Our sons are not arrested, but we ask for your help because all the sons of Korea are our own sons."51

After the basic agreements between Korea and Japan were provisionally signed on February 10, 1965, and bloody demonstrations by the students denouncing the ratification of the treaty again spread throughout the country, the Council of Korean Christian Churches released the statement "Our Opinions on the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Korea and Japan" on April 17.

In this statement, the Korean church approved in principle diplomatic normalization with Japan but pointed out several things in the basic contents of the provisional agreements:52 first, the government should consider both pros and cons of the people’s opinion; second, the Peace Line, that is, the lifeline for the fisherman, should be protected; third, the activities of Japanese fishing boats in Korean waters should be regulated; fourth, the United States should coordinate its anti-communist strategies with Japan as the leader in the Asian region; fifth, differences of opinion about the Korea-Japan talks should be adjusted in the best interest of the nation so as to avoid radical confrontations between the government and the opposition camps. This statement by the council showed a neutral attitude, comprehensively pertaining to both pros and cons in view of Christ’s "Gospels of Reconciliation."~~

On July 1, immediately after the formal signing of the Korea- Japan agreements on June 22, the Church was reinvigorated with the announcement of another statement signed by 215 ministers and Christian leaders, including Kim Chae-jun, Han Kyong-jik. Kang Sin-myong, Kang Won-ryong and Ham Sok-hon. This statement assumed from the Christian viewpoint that reopening diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan based on a truthful understanding is desirable, but dedication and cooperation for exploration of a new history should be promised and past wrongs should be repented in order for a truthful understanding to emerge. It sharply criticized the contents of the proposed Korea-Japan Treaty for forgiving past Japanese sins without seeking repentance from Japan, and thus, the treaty created the framework for a new history with Japan without addressing the injustices of past Japanese colonialism.

This position formed the basis for the activities that the Korean church began to organize as the Church moved from words to actions. Sponsored by the ministers and clergy of the Seoul area, the Prayer Service for the Country was held at Yongnak Church on July 5-6, attended by about 3,000 people each day. This atmosphere intensified as more than 6,500 people gathered at Yongnak Church on July 11 for a mass prayer service to oppose ratification of the treaty.54 The tide opposing ratification, stirred by the Seoul clergy, rapidly spread throughout the country.

On July 1, the Cholla-pukto branch of the Korean Presbyterian Church announced its resolution to support the statement by the Council of the Korean Christian Churches; and on July 4, more than 500 people who attended the mass prayer meeting sponsored by the Kunsan Christian Association held a street demonstration against ratification and clashed with police.55 On that same day, more than 500 ministers of all Christian denominations and presbyters of Taejon held a prayer meeting for the country. The following day about 40 ministers of the Pusan area announced a statement opposing ratification. In the meantime, the petition campaign led by the Christian Mothers Association since July 5 had collected more than 100,000 signatures in two weeks. The Korean church, thus, became a vigorous force in the country again as it overcame its lifelessness of the recent past.

It was not the whole Korean church that joined the campaign against ratification, however. A substantial number of ministers kept quiet, and some Christian leaders openly criticized the Church’s participation in politics. Major dailies and Christian periodicals carried statements strongly criticizing the campaigns by churches opposing ratification, such as Minister Kim Sok- chan’s statement "Against Church Interference in Politics" on August 10; "The Church Should Not Override in the National Conflict of Pros and Cons on Ratification" jointly signed on August 12 by about 10 former chaplains, including a Minister Pak; and "The Clergymen’s View on Ratification of the Korea-Japan Agreement." The reasons why they opposed the Church’s participation in politics are contained in the following points:

• Normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan is fundamentally what the nation wants and what our allies are expecting.

• Approval of ratification of the Korea-Japan agreement is the true prelude for reunification of south and north Korea.

• Christians should learn proper participation in social activities before indulging in political participation.

• It is an act that degrades holiness and the authority of the church, a place where Christians worship God, for them to conduct political lectures and pass and announce various statements there.

• Management of the country should be entrusted to the ruler of the nation chosen by the people, and we religious people must be devoted to religious activities for the sake of the nation. (A position based on their claim that what belongs to Caesar must be given to Caesar.)

In spite of these inner conflicts and confrontations, the campaign to oppose ratification was a major trend in the Korean church. On July 27, the steering committee of clergy to oppose ratification adjusted and strengthened the Christian movement by abolishing the Clergymen’s Society To Oppose Ratification and formally organized the Christian Clergymen’s Association.56 In the meantime, the ratification bill was passed illegally by a special committee of the National Assembly in the middle of the night on August 11, and it was passed by the assembly’s official session on August 14, unattended by the opposition party. This legislative maneuvering stirred the Church again.

The Korean church, unified through the Clergymen’s Association, held an urgent prayer meeting to save the country at Saemunan Church beginning on August 12. It continued for two more days; and on August 15, National Liberation Day, the Clergymen’s Association sponsored simultaneous mass prayer meetings throughout the country strongly criticizing the illegal passing of the ratification bill. The clergy’s statement made at the prayer meeting on August 13, demanding nullification of the ratification bill, sharply denounced the illegal act of the government:

"Democracy no longer exists in the political reality of this country, and the constitutional order has been destroyed. We cannot overlook this strangulation of democracy, and we declare that we must not be forced to observe the constitutional order that the ruling political party itself has destroyed."57

In Seoul, about 2,700 people attended a mass prayer meeting held at Yongnak Church on August 15 when the Liberation Day prayer service for saving the nation was held throughout the country. After the prayer service, the participants began a street demonstration carrying national flags in their hands and the slogan "Nullify Ratification" across their chests and waving placards that read "Protect Our Country by Abolishing the Korea-Japan Agreements." As they headed for the National Assembly, the government, who passed the ratification bill by force, used force to stop the demonstration. Many ministers and women were beaten by the cudgels of the plainclothes police officers and task force, and several ministers were arrested.

The ratification bill passed the National Assembly, however, and became an established fact in spite of these national protests. This led the church movement to lapse into a lull. Although the campaign to oppose ratification was not much of a success, it has a conspicuous significance in the history of the Korean church. Its historical importance can be found in the fact that the Church terminated its anti-historic, stagnated phase of involvement that had permeated its life since national liberation and began to advocate church participation in the nation’s social and political reality after the April 19 Revolution.

C. The Registration Law for Social Organizations and the Church

The fact that the Korean church started to emerge as a major social and political power was well reflected in governmental policies toward Christianity after the church campaign to oppose ratification. After the raging opposition against the Korea-Japan talks subsided in the period of 1964-1965, the government attempted to devise the Campus Protection Law and the Journalism Ethics Commission Law to curb the students and the press that emerged as the most powerful elements of the political opposition; and in early-June 1965, the government formed the Inquiry Commission for Religion to prepare "the bill for revision of the law pertaining to the registration of social organizations" that aimed to strengthen control over religious organizations. Approximately two years before this flurry of legislative activity, the Park regime had proclaimed on December 3, 1963, that "Article 18 of the new Constitution guaranteeing freedom of association will be respected, and free organization and activities of fraternities will be guaranteed...while the registration system for religious organizations shall be abolished."58

The Christian community as well as public opinion expressed a concerned interest in this recommendation to strengthen control and regulation of religious organizations under the pretext of sanctioning quasireligions. The Chosun Ilbo in its June 18, 1965, editorial criticized this move by the government:

" for the quasi-religions, it would be absurd to demand them to oppose others from the viewpoint of the existing religions, and it should be criticized if the government, which exercises state power, should categorize certain religions or associations as quasi-religions."

The Christian Newspaper delivered to the government the antagonizing responses of the Korean Christian community from the results of its questionnaires.59 The government, however, conducted a formal investigation of quasi-religious organizations through the Home Affairs Ministry beginning on August 5 and later submitted the revision bill to the National Assembly on November 5.

The government explained why it was submitting the bill to the assembly as follows:

"...its purpose is to promote sound activities by social organizations by means of regulating illegal or improper acts upsetting the social order through unauthorized practices...

"The gist of the revision bill is: (1) religious groups are subject to this law; (2) the concerned authority will be given the function to demand submission of or to investigate accounting books, documents or various data of the organizations in addition to the regular reports; (3) the authority can cancel the registration of the organizations whose activities violate the specifications in their papers or whose activities have no visibility for a year since registration; (4) punishment to the leader of such organizations will be maximized to imprisonment of up to six months~r a fine of up to 500,000 won (US$662 at 1991 exchange rates).’

The Church decided that the revision bill was an obvious violation of their freedom of religion and thus began a protest campaign. On November 18, the National Council of Churches demanded immediate withdrawal of the revision bill in a statement pointing out the evils of the law: (1) it shows the apparent intentions of the government to interfere with religious activities; (2) it violates the basic right of freedom of belief; and (3) it will hamper the autonomous growth of religious organizations.61

On November 23, the international committee of the National Council of Churches summoned a conference of the leaders of the 14 Christian denominations, including the Presbyterian Church, and drew up a recommendation demanding that the government withdraw the bill with the unanimous signed agreement that "the revision bill is an apparent violation of freedom of religion and serious damage to religious activities will be incurred." This recommendation was then dispatched to various administrative channels.62 The conference also resolved to resist the law by total refusal to register even if the revision bill passed the National Assembly.63

By December 2, public opinion opposing the revision bill expanded so much as to include the protest of Christians who had not attended the November 23 conference as well as Catholic, Buddhist and Confucian leaders.64 On December 6 at the symposium held by the Yonhap Christian Newspaper on "The Revision Bill of Social Organizations Registration," a concerned Education Ministry official clearly illustrated the intentions of the revision:

"...Some religious groups caused significant bafflements and were criticized by the sensible people of society during the Korea-Japan talks, but there were no laws governing such...To prevent such mishaps, this ‘revision bill’ is devised..."65

The intentions of the government as revealed in this explanation by the Education Ministry official was governmental revenge for the active participation of the Church in political activities as exhibited in its campaign against ratification of the Korea-Japan agreements. The revision bill, however, had to be suspended in the assembly because of the strong protest of the Church.

The government, however, planned to pass the revision bill again in the National Assembly during its extraordinary session from June 15 to July 15, 1966, despite the opposition of the Christian community, but it postponed the decision a second time. Since then, the revision bill became a weapon of the regime of the Republican Party to use against the Church whenever there was a political conflict.

D. The June 8 Rigged Election, the Constitutional Amendment for a Third Presidential Term and the Church

While undergoing oppression during the campaign against ratification and the government’s attempt to amend the social organizations registration law, the awareness for participation in political realities intensified within the Korean church.

Immediately after the campaign against ratification of the Korea-Japan Treaty ended, the National Council of Churches and the East Asia Christian Conference (EACC), the predecessor of the present Christian Conference of Asia (CCA), co-sponsored the Conference of Korean Christian Leaders with the theme of "The Christian Community in Human Society" on January 17-20, 1966.66 At this meeting attended by 56 Christian leaders, Minister Kang Won- yong made it clear in his lecture that the Church’s attitude towards realistic issues in society should be changed to a more progressive and participating perspective, saying, "The Church does not exist by itself but as a serving function for God..., and the task that the Christian community faces in human society is the renovation of the Church itself and improvement of its relations with society."

One of the topics discussed at a subcommittee meeting at this conference was "political participation by Christians" in connection with "the renovation of the Church." This was the first time that the Church’s participation in politics was formally treated on the church level in the mid-1960s. At this meeting, discussion mainly dealt with the question: "If the Church participates in politics, is the concept of church ‘Ecclesia’ (the centered church) or ‘Diaspora’ (the dispersed church)? That is, can the political convictions of an individual who believes in Christ be interpreted as an act of the Church or not?" The participants concluded that "in general situations the collective political act is possible on the part of the Church; but in extreme political situations, only individual decisions are possible, but these cannot be interpreted as a mere citizen’s act."

This, in effect, recognized that when a Christian performs a political act, the same as that of an ordinary citizen, that act can be considered as a decision taken in the religious realm done at the request of Christ; it was theological support for Christians’ participation in politics. This conference also noted that "Christians’ participation in politics so far has been lacking a sense of identity, and therefore, it revealed frictions and weakness in the Church." The conference showed quite positive and realistic approaches towards political participation by recommending "establishment of a specialized research institute to support authoritative background" for the continual political participation of the Church. In addition, they made a resolution that "the success of democracy depends on fair elections and the termination of corruption" in domestic politics and that the Church should lead an enlightenment campaign of this fact.

The Christian community turned active again as the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1967 neared. KSCM, which began to undertake many activities after Minister Pak Hyong-kyu took the office of secretary in October 1966, launched a large-scale campaign for fair elections by sponsoring simultaneously in five major cities across the country on April 24-25 a lecture meeting on "The Growth of Korean Democracy and the Christian Existence" in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of its inauguration.

The topic on the first day was "The Growth of Democracy in Korea and the Nation’s Awareness of Sovereignty" with "The Christians’ Political Responsibility and the Method of Political Participation" as the topic on the second day. The speakers were Chang I-uk and Hyon Yong-hak in Seoul; Kang Won-ryong and Chi Myong-gwan in Taejon; Chi Myong-gwan and No Chang-sop in Chonju; So Nam-dong and No Chong-hyon in Taegu; and No Chong-hyon and So Nam-dong in Pusan.

In spite of such enormous efforts to promote a fair election, the June 8 parliamentary election was an unprecedentedly rigged electoral exercise. As the students’ demonstrations grew violent, KSCM delivered an open letter to its members on June 15:

"Our society now faces again the crisis of chaos and disorder and collapse because of the injustices committed in the June 8 election. However, as we hate injustices, we also know that destruction of order can nurture further injustices. The spirit of the April19 Revolution should survive, but that incident should not be responsible for this rigged election that will bury democracy in Korea. All eligible voters and the opposition party should also be criticized. Wishing to live with Christ at campus, we will have to seek a responsible way of participation in this critical situation."67

This letter recommended that prayer meetings for repentance, debates or research activities about the political structure that caused corruption and injustice were better ways to take for Christian students rather than demonstrations denouncing the rigged election.

The National Council of Churches also summoned an emergency action committee on June 21 to probe ways to respond to the political situation. They resolved: (1) to hold nationwide prayer meetings for the country to persevere during this crisis; (2) to release a formal statement; and (3) to elect representatives to meet government and Republican Party leaders to present the views of the Church.

The statement released on this date declared that the injustices of the June 8 election were "not merely a political matter but a basic infringement on the nation’s sovereignty" and that they were "a dangerous and foolish act to topple the basis of democracy," which was "caused by the abuse of political power and a lack of will to realize democracy." The statement warned that "political power should be based on moral responsibility and social justice for the future of the State and the nation, or else power may turn to an atrocious dictatorship." It asked the government "to abandon the attitude of suppressing the just protests of the people, to pass the crisis by temporizing means and to seek some fundamental solution detached from private or party interests." The statement asked Christians "to maintain a sense of responsibility as a proper Christian at this time of crisis and defend the future of democracy in this land by means of prayers and religious unity."68

However, the National Council of Churches meeting that was convened on June27 for organization of the countermove committee as suggested by the June21 resolution faced the following objections: (1) the Church should avoid excessive political participation; and (2) the resolution cannot be interpreted as representing the views of the whole Church. After debating the issues, the recommendations for nationwide prayer meetings and the committee’s contact with political leaders were rejected.

In the meantime, Minister Kim Chaejun, who had been playing a leading role in the Church’s participation in political activities since the campaign against the Korea-Japan talks, clarified the historic role of Christians during the June 8 crisis as follows:

"We will not take partial attitudes with political inclinations whatsoever. We remain detached as to whom the political power belongs to or to whom it is transferred, but we cannot overlook injustice in any case, whoever might have caused it. That is because it is the essence of our religion to establish justice in this land..."69

On March 2, 1969, the National Council of Churches held a rally at Pagoda Park to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the March 1 Independence Movement. A resolution was adopted that pointed out the structural deformities of Korean society, that criticized the weakness of the Church and that called upon believers in Christ to exert their utmost efforts as Christians to renovate the social absurdities in the country.

"Although we desire democracy, human dignity is deprived, and the realization of political justice is so far away while administrative errors are repeated in our society. While modernization is advocated, only a few members of the privileged class are enjoying prosperity, indulging in luxury and dissipation, while the populace live in poverty.

"Although we live in this social reality of our nation, we are not fulfilling our mission as Christians before God. We have failed to promote understanding and harmony through Jesus Christ but instead have indulged in conflicts and factionalism. Our prayers, while we were ignoring our neighbor’s poverty and the national crisis, were nothing more than an untrue service dedicated to the God of Justice.

"Christians confirm that the unjust social structure, unfair politics and prevalent corruption are betrayals against God, and we resolve to fight against them. We will unite all our just powers for the realization of a true human community."70

With these events and discussions as background, the Korean church began its crusade against the constitutional amendment to allow presidents to serve three consecutive presidential terms, which emerged as the most important national controversy in the late-1960s. The method of participation by the Kcwean church, however, was through individual Christians rather than through a church or unified organization. Minister Kim Chaejun joined these efforts as the chairman of the Committee for National Struggle against the Constitutional Amendment for which other Christian leaders, like Ham Sok-hon and Pak Hyong-gyu, worked as members.71

Representing the National Struggle Committee, Minister Kim Chae- jun delivered the statement "To All the Religious Brethren of the Country" on August 15 urging Christians’ determination and participation:

"Not only religious individuals but the Church as a whole can attain a true life through their determination to defend justice with their life. ...We must renew our awareness that we are the fighters for justice who seek out injustice and impeach it upon the basis of the Gospels. Therefore, our Church is now facing the moment to exert its prophetic function more than ever. We should bear the yoke as servants to Christ and march all over the country to tell them of our determination; [we should] organize and launch a popular movement..."

Contrary to efforts by these Christian leaders, some conservative leaders openly supported the constitutional amendment with various statements proclaimed to confuse the Christian community. On September 4, a statement entitled "On the Constitutional Amendment and Free Conscience" was signed by 242 conservative ministers, including Kim Yun-chan, Pak Hyong-ryong, Cho Yong-gi, Kim Chun-gon and Kim Chang-hwan, under the name of the Christian Clergymen Concerned with the Constitutional Amendment and Free Conscience.72 They criticized Minister Kim Chaejun’s plea as an instigating act that would "cause confusion in the innocent and good hearts of countless Christians." They also attacked Christians’ participation in political activities with explicit statements: "If one forces opposition to the constitutional amendment by the mane of Christ, our Gospels will be degraded while the opposition movement is donned in sacred robes, and we can expect the comedy of the opposition propagandists acting as martyrs." They insisted it was the proper Christian attitude to "pray every day for the head of state, our president, the leader."

The next day, September 5, "Our Opinion on the Constitutional Amendment"73 was announced by the Daehan Council of Churches, who caused further confusion and controversy among the Christian community and society as a whole with their open support for the amendment:

"We Christians welcome President Park Chung-hee’s courageous determination concerning the constitutional amendment. ...We need a strong leader at a time like this considering the internal situations."

In response to this, the National Council of Churches published a statement on September 6 to clarify that "the Daehan Council of Churches is an organization that has no relationship with the National Council of Churches." Provoked by the confusion and challenge within the Christian community, the council also published a statement on September 8 to explain its position of opposition to the constitutional amendment. The statement that was announced after a lot of debate and correction, however, was a rather ambiguous one. It confirmed the basic stand that "Christians in Korea have strived to fulfill their prophetic mission as requested by the times and have always prayed to realize God’s will in this country. Therefore, the political situations we are facing these days cannot be totally ‘separated from religion." As for the constitutional amendment itself, however, the statement was rather circumvent: "We express deep concern and regret for the recommendation of the constitutional amendment that causes conflict and weakening of the national consensus." The first draft expressed stronger objection to the amendment, but it was changed to this tepid expression through the process of conflicting discussions.74

Because of this weakness in reaching an internal unified position, the Korean church in 1969 failed to demonstrate a more positive and clear stance towards the constitutional amendment. However, through the accumulation of experiences in political participation - self-criticism derived from the shock of the April 19 Revolution, the campaign against the Korea-Japan talks, denouncement of the June 8 rigged election and the campaign against the constitutional amendment - participation by the Church in the reality of Korea was solidified in spite of multiple inner conflicts. In addition, the force within the Church for active participation in the life of the Korean people was expanded and further organized as the awareness of various social problems intensified with the nation’s modernization and rapid economic growth.

What Minister Pak Hyong-gyu wrote after the constitutional amendment was passed by force well shows the awareness of the Korean church of the context of that time75

"Now the power of darkness has started to rise again. It is time for the Sons of Light to wear full armor. The Korean church that fought against Japanese imperialism to defend the Light of the Fatherland, that shed much blood of martyrdom to fight against the Red aggressors, now has to confront the power of The Fight."


E. The July 4 Joint Communique on National Unification and the Church

A joint communique was announced by south and north Korea on July 4,1972, in the name of Yi Hu-rak and Kim Yong-ju. In this communique, both parties agreed on three principles for national reunification:76 first, unification should be achieved independently without any dependence on or interference by foreign powers; second, unification should be achieved by peaceful means without resorting to military forces opposing the other; third, national unity should be promoted first, overcoming differences in ideologies, beliefs and systems.

This communique caused an enormous shock. Various strata of society responded by expressing their reactions, including the Christian community. The Committee of Church and Society of the Korean Presbyterian Church issued "The Statement on the July 4 South-North Korean Joint Communique," which pointed out:

"1. ...on any account, basic human dignity and freedom should not be violated...

"2. ...It is desired that the democratic system and the spirit of freedom that constitute the basis of this country must not be repressed or hampered.

"3. All the discussions and negotiations for future agreements should use the legalized process of representing the national consensus through open discussions.

"4. ...Our government should lead the campaign for social renovation by quickly eliminating corruption and injustice as well as eliminating the gap between the rich and the poor that is the factor for all social unrest."

The Church emphasized the values of democracy and freedom and pointed out the ambiguity of "overcoming ideologies." Han Kyong-jik, Chon Taek-bu, Kim Kwan-sok, Kang Won-yong and Ham Sok- hon77 respectively emphasized democratic values and the process of democratic debate, and Dr. Paek Nak-jun interpreted this in view of "the prevention of military conflicts."78 Minister Mun Ik-hwan said that in our confrontation with the Communists "we have to bravely eliminate the absurdity of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer to win the competition with the Communists." He claimed that we have to follow the examples of Amos and Hosea and Isaiah and Jeremiah in handling irregularities and absurdities in society and in realizing justice.79 Minister Pak Hyong-gyu insisted:

"What the Church has to do is more urgent in south Korea. Social justice has to be realized first of all, or the people of south Korea will be seduced by the temptation and instigation of the Communists. The people’s independence and self-determination have to be solidified in the process of this realization of social justice. The Church has to be always on the side of the people as an organization thinking and acting with the people so that the people will have confidence that we can build a welfare state by ourselves without borrowing the magic of communism. Then the Church will lead the people’s movement through which a just and free society will be realized in south Korea, and the Korean Peninsula will be unified."80

Thus, the reaction of the Christian community towards the "July 4 South-North Joint Communique" can be summarized as: Peace, freedom and justice are the shortcut to national unification, and they are to be achieved through the realization of social justice, the prevention of war and the establishment of a free democracy.

But the Korean church had not been entirely mute prior to this point in history. The Korean church had kept praying for national unification at church services ever since the peninsula’s division. In particular, the magazine Christian Thought discussed matters directly related to national unification as well as indirectly related matters, such as peaceful coexistence and dialog between the Church and Marxism.81 Among them, we will briefly review the contents of the opinions directly connected with national unification.

When national unification was earnestly discussed among the people immediately after the April 19 Revolution in 1960, Minister Kang Wonyong pointed out that national unification was not a matter to be overlooked and emphasized that we have to seek and promote a safe and feasible plan. He introduced the possibility of unification supported primarily by the United Nations and the United States and insisted that our missions were ideological armament, the establishment of sound economic plans and overcoming the Church’s fear of communism. He maintained. that the most fundamental condition for national unification was a general election based on democratic principles to establish a government whose order is secured by our own strength. He explained that we have to be prepared, first, to meet the challenge of preserving our constitutional functions in order to defend the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; second, to preserve free political activities by all political parties in south Korea while recognizing the political parties of north Korea; and third, to withdraw foreign troops at an apPropriate time either before or after the establishment of a new government.82

More thoughts about unification were also made in Christian Thought by Park Sang-jung, who was executive secretary of KSCM, in his thesis "National Unification for Our Life." He said that we had lived in a state of "peaceful coexistence" and that Christians should maintain peaceful ways. If national unification was the nation’s long-cherished desire, he said, it should be achieved, not by military confrontation and struggle against the Communists, but by defeating communism through renovation by the Church and the Holy Spirit.83

In the next issue of Christian Thought, however, Minister Kim Sok-chan asserted in his essay "National Unification and Our Mission" that one would not dream of the peaceful reunification of south and north Korea if they really knew what communism was like.84

Although the rather open attitude of the Church towards the matter of national unification was thwarted after the May 16 Military Revolution in 1961, discussion of national unification became a prominent topic again in the 1970s. Minister Kim Kwan-suk suggested that national participation in education and training for peaceful progress be considered and that joint research by various liberal sciences concerning peace be conducted. These were among the conclusions from the meeting sponsored by SODEPAX in April 1970, which also sought efforts by theologians to establish views of the State and peace for unification of Korea within the universal community; to develop a theology of unification; and to build unity of personality and unity of community.85

Dr. Han Chol-ha, who has conservative inclinations, emphasized four missionary strategies in view of the unification of south and north Korea: first, non-strategic evangelism based on the theology of glory with the transcending voice; second, an evangelism strategy in accordance with the progressive strategy of national unification proceeding from a state of war to competition in good will and mutual interchanges to unification; third, dialog between communism and Christians; and lastly, the solidification of the attitude of the Church. In solidifying the attitude of the Church, he asserted that the Church should be the leader in south Korea in establishing a prophetic society in a unified Korea.86

The above opinions are a general summary of the thoughts expressed by the Christian community about national unification prior to the early1970s. Apparently the "July 4 South-North Joint Communique" provided an opportunity for the Korean church to reflect on the matter of national unification. In that respect, the joint communique was an important event for the Korean church. In general, the Korean church desired unification while emphasizing the political values of free democracy.

Based on this perspective, the theology of unification recently presented by Prof. Chu Chae-yong summarizes the Church’s view of unification to this point in time. Prof. Chu Chae-yong clarified that the unification theory of the Korean church is not a presentation of practical methods but of principles to provide the basis for it. The principles of unification theology by Prof. Chu Chae-yong are summarized below.87

As a prerequisite, the theology of unification emphatically recommends "penitence." Both’south and north Korea should humbly repent with a sense of responsibility for the nation’s division without blaming each other for it. Self-renewal is a prerequisite to make the existence of unification theology possible. Prof. Chu Chae-yong then cites "shalom," "integrity" and "encounter" as the essence of unification theology.

First of all, the theology of unification is the theology of shalom. "Shalom" here signifies not mere peace in the sense that military actions are terminated, but it is a word pregnant with peace, joy, mutual dependency, coexisting and social harmony and social justice that can be experienced by the wholeness of human existence on the level of humanity’s whole history. Isaiah 9:2-7 is said to be an excellent representation of the fantasy of the new age abundant with shalom. Shalom, again, is summarized by the following three elements: "reconciliation," "freedom" and "hope." In brief, what shalom signifies is never the gravity-free state, but the harmony achieved in confrontation, understanding and conflict.

Secondly, the theology of unification is the theology of integrity. This integrity, however, does not mean simple oneness. True unification is the unification of the separated person and the person - the wholesome unification of the divided person. Therefore, the unification of the nation is impossible without the integrity of the person, but this integrity recognizes unity in diversity and diversity in unity. Therefore, this integrity is not "uniformity."

Thirdly, the theology of unification is the theology of encounter. When the South-North Coordinating Committee convened in Pyongyang in 1972, a reporter who visited north Korea to meet his northern brethren said that he had met "the organization," not the people, and that he had had a "dialog with the organization" there. Prof. Chu Chae-yong quoted Martin Buber to describe this encounter as dialog between "I" and "it" and emphasized that our encounter and dialog should be that of "you" and "I."

In conclusion, Prof. Chu Chae-yong summarized tersely that the unification theology of the Korean church is the theology of the people. For the matter of national unification is not an accessory of existence nor a mere play of the concept. It is something that derives from the supplication of the people who have gone through the pains of division, and it should be a bloody outcry of the people who scream in resentment of their division and separation. In other words, it is the theology of the people based on a love for life because it is the supplication of the people crying out, "Help!"

VI. The Yushin System and the Church

A. The Democratization Movement and Church Participation

When the Yushin system was established in a blitzkrieg in October 1972, future relations characterized by significant tension and conflict between the Korean church and the political power could be foreseen.

The economic growth policies that had been pushed by the ruling power since 1965 brought conspicuous social and economic changes in Korean society; and with the formation of the Yushin system, the forces seeking a new social balance surfaced.88 It seems the ruling power decided to establish the Yushin system because they thought a strong political system was needed to cope with these changes.89 In addition, the shocking events in the international economic order and transitions in the political context around the Korean Peninsula, such as the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, caused difficulties in domestic politics.

On the other hand, the Korean church went through a period of rapid growth because of the social unrest and the policies seeking religious growth. At the same time, new theological theories dealing with the social problems as their evangelic mission, such as localization theology and the theology of social participation, had been active since the mid-1960s. Active urban and rural evangelism by the Korean National Council of Churches for the local inhabitants and laborers as well as new awareness of the historical mission of Christian students and professors also were promoted in the Korean church. These changes in the Church were a form of adaptation to the rapid transitions in Korean society rather than the effects of outside influences. This transformation can be easily detected in the statement and resolution adopted at the rally for realization of social justice sponsored by the Korean Christian Action Organization (KCAO) in 1971.90 The proclamation of this rally asserted:

"Now the extreme inequality and lack of freedom, stifling oppression and poverty have driven innocent workers, farmers and ordinary citizens into despair; and corruption, immorality, luxury and extravagance of a small group of privileged people established on the basis of political and financial power and technological skills are corrupting wholesale the human conscience.

And the resolution adopted by this rally comprised 12 points, including the following:

• The clergy and intellectuals of all the churches should stand on the side of the oppressed people and fight for the realization of social justice.

• Do not oppress the true conscientious voice of the people in the name of law and order.

• Stop the secret intelligence administration immediately, and do not use the sacred military forces as the means to oppress the freedom of the campus.

The organizations that attended this rally included the Daehan Catholic Students Confederation, Catholic Workers Youth Association, Anyang Workers’ Hall, the Christian Academy, the Christian Urban Industrial Evangelism Committee, the Metropolitan Evangelists Commission, the Daehan Catholic Intellectual Organizations Federation, the Catholic Working Elders Society, the Committee of the Seoul Diocese Clergymen, Hanguk Christian Students Federation and the Korean YMCA. This inner transition of the Christian movement is considered to be one of the factors that caused tense relations between the political power and the Church.

This tense environment was caused by the effects of various factors within and without. It was created through proclamation of the Garrison Decree in October 1971; formation of the Yushin system on October 17, 1972; a series of emergency measures based on the Yushin Constitution;91 and legislation of the Social Security Law. In this transitional process of the political context, Christian theories and practices of participation in history and reality caused conflicts with the political power under the Yushin system, which are summarized below.

The first incident involving a Christian clergyman under the Yushin system took place on December 13, 1972, when Minister Un Myong-gi of Nammun Presbyterian Church in Chonju was arrested on charges of violating the decree prohibiting the circulation of false rumors while conducting an overnight prayer service with the congregation.92

Another important incident occurred during the Easter service on Namsan Hill on April 22, 1973. During the joint Easter service co-sponsored by the Korean National Council of Churches and the Daehan Christian Council, advocates of church participation in social activities93 criticized the Yushin administration and demanded the "recovery of democracy" and the "restoration of freedom of speech." In connection with this incident, the Presbyterian Church adopted "The Declaration of a Religious Society" on August 7, 1973, and held the Council for Religion and Human Rights94 on November 23-24. This was an important event that provided the basis for human rights evangelism.

The Korean church also increased its criticism against the Yushin system in many other ways. This activity was carried out by Christian student movement bodies, social evangelism organizations and church councils. For this prophetic mission, groups were organized within the Church, and they joined non- Christian organizations, such as the National Council for the Preservation of Democracy.

Organizations within the Church were diverse and comprehensive, including the human rights committee, church and society committee, etc., of the Korean National Council of Churches; various executive secretariats; and the Catholic Prelate Group as well as the frontline mission groups, such as the Christian student organizations, intellectuals’ campaign bodies, Christian clergymen’s organizations and Catholic priest groups.

When the democratization movement took the form of a national campaign to seek revision of the Constitution, the Yushin government attempted to suppress it by proclaiming Presidential Emergency Measures No.1 and 2. The junior ministers of the Korean Christian church challenged these measures and were arrested on January 17, 1974.95 Related to these arrests were the comments of the government’s education minister who attempted to define the limits of pure religious activities on February 9,1974, by saying that "only pure religious activities" will be allowed. These arrests also occurred within a context in which the government and the Korean Christian community were engaged in a debate on the relationship of the Church and State. On February 15, the Korean National Council of Churches sent a letter to the prime minister demanding an end to "the church investigation" and urging release of the arrested clergy members.

Amid this turmoil, Christian leaders and the leaders of Christian student movements were arrested in connection with the "Democratic Youth Federation incident,"96 as tension between the Church and the Yushin government reached extremes. To cope with this situation, the Korean National Council of Churches on April 11, 1974, organized a human rights committee, which began its work with attempts to save the arrested clergy members. The Unified Conference of the Korean Presbyterian Church also released a proclamation demanding the release of the arrested clergy members at its 59th convention.

This frequent confrontation between the Church and the Yushin government developed into an international affair. Controversies arose concerning the deportation of the Rev. George E. Ogle, an American Methodist missionary, on December 14, 1974, and Fr. James Sinnot, an American Catholic priest of the Maryknoll Order, as the international dimensions of the Church and the Yushin government confronted each other. Meanwhile, the World Student Christian Federation (WSCF) and the World Council of Churches (WCC) dispatched investigation teams, demonstrating the international ties of the Christian church.

The Christian leaders once again clashed with the Yushin government when the leaders of the Catholic and Protestant churches released "The March 1 Democratic Declaration of Saving the Nation" at the prayer service commemorating the independence movement at Myongdong Cathedral on March 1, 1976. This declaration attacked the anti-democratic elements of the Yushin system. In a sense, the Church challenged the system as it considered democracy the justified basis for a political system. Since the Korean Christian church considered participation in "democratization" an essential evangelistic activity, it was an important task for the Korean church to push the Yushin government to achieve a practical democratic state. What mattered here was democracy. It, of course, included the matters of human rights and social justice.

Another important point about which the Yushin government and the Korean church collided was the ideological interpretation of the Church’s demand for social justice. The arrest of Minister Kang Hi-nam on suspicion of violating the Anti-Communism Law on November 5, 1977;97 the Christian Academy incident on March 9, 1979;98 and the controversy over the alleged pro- communist activities of the urban industrial evangelism mission99 ignited ideological confrontations between the Yushin government and the Korean church. (This matter causes~the argument of whether involvement by the Church in issues concerning social justice is based on religious faith or ideology. For the Church, social justice is based on faith, rather than ideology. It is natural that the Church is sensitive about social justice and challenges injustice.) It is unfortunate though that ideological confrontation took place between the Yushin government and the Korean church. However, if the Christian church or any religion does not respond with sensitivity to reality and participate in the life of the people to achieve social justice, any democratic state will consider them "the salt without taste."

There were also many other major and minor incidents between the government and the Church. The arrest of the executive secretary of the Korean National Council of Churches100and the dismissal of the Christian professors101 deserve to be highlighted, however, because they reveal a characteristic of the Yushin system: they contain elements bf revenge and oppression against the Church for its activities of criticizing the Yushin system.

In conclusion, the Korean Christian church under the Yushin system continued its growth while gaining acute evangelistic interest in the extreme dehumanization taking place amid the social absurdities in Korea that derived from the nation’s rapid social transitions. In effect, this led the Korean Christian church to take a critical stand against the undemocratic tendencies of the Yushin system, to participate in the democratization movement and to strive for social evangelism, that is, participation in the country’s social reality. The Yushin government though attempted to limit the meaning of freedom of religion and tried to discourage church participation in Korea’s social reality through defining the nature of religion and evangelism, but the Korean church could not, and will not, give up its evangelistic mission.

B. The State and Christian Education

In discussing the topic of the State and Christian education, two points must be mentioned to serve as a background for this issue: (1) historically the State and education have had a close relationship; (2) the Church has contributed much to the development of education in Korea. However, many conflicts have occurred, even in the days of Japanese colonialism, between the State and the participation of the Church in education.

During the Park Chung-hee regime, the Private School Law affecting Christian private schools was proclaimed102 The Christian community reacted with sensitivity and insisted that the Private School Law contained certain factors that would ignore or oppress the purpose and spirit of private education. They argued that by making a corporate juridical person a school juridical person the government was, in effect, forcing the educational organizations to drop out of the Church and the council.103 The Christian community also expressed concern when the Education Ministry instructed private middle schools to stop religious education and religious events on May 23, 1968.

On September 9, 1968, a recommendation to demand autonomy of Christian schools was submitted to the Education Ministry and the Republican Party in the name of the executive secretaries of the council and the five denominations under the Korean National Council of Churches. On November 12, 1968, the Education Ministry sent a reply guaranteeing autonomy of the Christian schools,104 but this matter was still unsolved as the government’s education minister again released directives on religious education and events in elementary, middle and high schools on March 25, 1970, that completely forbid prayer services or Bible studies in Christian schools:

"I. ...In the classes for regular curriculum, no religious education or event whatsoever can be undertaken.

"2. ...Participation in religious education and events should not be forced.

"3. … Because of the [different] denominational religious theories..., if they have to be carried out in normal cIasses, the schools are advised to be reorganized as various schools."105

To cope with this situation, the principals of the downtown Christian schools in Seoul held a meeting in the office of the principal of Paejae High School on April 2, 1970, but they did not reach any definite conclusions.

When the Education Ministry again instructed Christian schools to make Bible studies, which are a compulsory course in Christian schools, an optional subject in April 1973, the Pyongbuk Kohwe pointed out its absurdities at its 114th meeting on April 4.

Later the Education Ministry issued stronger directives: first, Bible studies should be excluded from the compulsory curriculum; second, the students must not be forced to attend the prayer services; third, the oath to undertake religious education must not be forced; fourth, school chaplains must not be employed; and fifth, Biblical textbooks must not be sold at school.

In response, the Korean National Council of Churches released a statement on April 16, 1973, demanding protection of the legally authorized Christian schools.106 The 10th regular convention of the Christian School Federation was summoned to Academy House in Suyuri on April 10-11 where it was decided to send petitions to the concerned authorities to permit Christian education at the Christian schools because "the fundamental purpose for founding the schools cannot be denied due to standardization of the private schools."107

Sponsored by the education department of the Korean Presbyterian Church (Unified), representatives from Christian schools of the Yejang Group gathered at Cheil Church in Taejon on August 16, 1973. They resolved that the church convention should release a strong resolution expressing their demand that Christian education be accepted as part of the regular curriculum and that Bible instructors be recognized as regular teachers.108

On September 20-24, the 58th convention of the Korean Presbyterian Church (Unified) was held at Saemunan Church in Seoul to discuss the theme of the "Evangelistic Mission of the Church." When the agenda turned the attention of the 332 representatives from throughout the country to normal Bible studies and the management of religious services, the convention turned into a turmoil of excitement with participants declaring that "the government oppression of Christian education is the oppression of religion." A statement was drawn up immediately to be delivered to all of the churches across the country.109 Minister Yu Ho-jun, the chairman of the convention, proclaimed in a joint interview of the Christian leaders that it would be persecution of Christianity if the government suppressed Christian education by force.

The matter of education at Christian schools continued to provoke tense confrontations between the government and the Church. The Christian schools did not discontinue their Christian education curriculum, however, including Bible studies. It was later rumored that the Republican Party was brooding over whether to present the bill for "canning religious education" to the government again in June 1976; but when the Christian community expressed sensitive reactions to this rumor, the government’s minister of culture and information said apprehensively that "the government and the ruling party have not considered any law to prohibit religious education, and this policy will be upheld in the future"110

In the meantime, the Christian community took action on January 22, 1977, to attempt to solve this problem. "The Suggestion Concerning Revision of the Private School Law" co-signed by the leaders of five denominations - the Presbyterian Church of Korea or PCK (Tonghap), the Korean Methodist Church, the Korean Presbyterian Church (Hapdong), the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea or PROK and the Daehan Holiness Evangelical Church - was submitted to President Park ChungheeY.111 But it was to no avail. In 1978, the Korean Presbyterian Church (Unified) chaired by Minister Im Taek-jin resolved to submit recommendations to the legislative body demanding that Article 45 of the revised Private School Law be replaced by that of the original.112 This kind of confrontation is, in fact, continuing even today.

The oppression of Christian education at Christian schools was one of the issues of confrontation between the Church and the State during the Park regime. This point of conflict, deriving from the standardization of middle and high schools, reveals the regime’s lack of sensitivity to the spirit of Korean education and its antagonistic relationship with religious education.

In a way, this was similar to the issue of eliminating religious education and rites from Christian private schools during the period of Japanese colonialism in order to achieve the educational goal of "educating the colonies of the empire." The democratic education of the people, however, should not be subordinated to the educational goal of nationalism: in this sense, democratic education must tolerate Christian education.

C. The Collusive Relationship between the State and Religion in the 1970s

The first Breakfast and Prayer Meeting for the President was held on February 3, 1966, when the Breakfast Prayer Meeting for the Christian Assemblymen was organized. The initiators of this meeting were the conservative Christian laymen among the Republican Party in the National Assembly and Minister Kim Chun- gon of Campus Crusade for Christ (CCC). A month later on March 8, 1966, another Breakfast Prayer Meeting for the President was held at the Chosun Hotel, unattended by the president, however. Since the Breakfast Prayer Meeting for the President on May 1, 1968, this event became an annual gathering that was held in early-May every year until 1974. After the eighth meeting in 1976, its name was changed to the Breakfast Prayer Meeting for the Country. This breakfast and prayer meeting was attended by 500 or 600 people, including laymen in the National Assembly from the Republican Party, conservative clergy members, such as Minister Kim Chun- gon, and presbyters of the financial community.

In an editorial about this meeting, the Gospel Sinbo wrote:

"The breakfast prayer meeting is not a political act. ...This is a significant event in the history of the Korean church..., and it is noteworthy that...Korean society is keenly interested in the activities of the Church."113

Opposing that opinion, however, was Minister No Hong-sop who criticized the meeting as contrary to the spirit of a Christian prayer service, although its name asserted that it was a prayer meeting.114 He criticized this meeting for its lack of concern for social justice and its absent sense of ethical responsibility because it was an unprecedented show in Korean history, a luxurious show that was completely devoid of the spirit of penitence. Minister No determined that it was, thus, a political show. He insisted that its initial plan and beginnings were political, its manner of gathering was political and such a meeting is impossible without political considerations because its purposes are political. In effect, the Breakfast Prayer Meeting for the President played the role of religiously justifying the Park regime.115

In addition to the Breakfast Prayer Meeting for the President, the Korean Christian businessmen group held the Prayer Meeting for the Prime Minister on November 9,1974. At this event, Kim Jong-pil, the prime minister at the time, caused a controversy by saying, "The Church should obey the State because the government is recognized by God," quoting Chapter 13 of Romans.

Another phenomenon of the ambiguous relationship between the political power and the Christian church was the promotion of large-scale revival rallies in the 1970s by foreign revivalists. The two main events representative of this phenomenon were the CCC national evangelism movement led by Minister Kim Chun-gon and the evangelism rally of Billy Graham in which all of the conservative powers led by Minister Han Kyongjik participated.

The national evangelism movement started by CCC later was supported by the conservative church. Fully utilizing the stirred atmosphere following the Billy Graham rally, Minister Kim Chun- gon planned an evangelism tour across the country in February 1971 under the title of "National Evangelism." He held the Meeting for the National Evangelism Movement in Kwangju in July 1971 under the auspices of the Kwangju CCC branch and conducted a five-day training rally for the fighters of national evangelism in Tajon in August1971 during the students’ summer vacation. This rally, attended by about 10,000 students under the slogan of "Let the Season of Christ Be in This Land," was the first large- scale rally in which the CCC students’ activities surfaced conspicuously. CCC then held a large rally in Chunchon in the summer of 1972 for the "sanctification of Chunchon"; and in August1973, Minister Kim Chun-gon announced plans for a mass rally called Explo ‘74 in June of the next year following the Billy Graham rally.

In line with these CCC activities, the preparatory committee for the Billy Graham rally led by Minister Han Kyong-jik, comprising 12 denominations, gathered in March 1971 and set May 1973 as the date for the rally.

In this environment, several conspicuous phenomena emerged. Through the Billy Graham rally, for instance, the Korean conservative church movement attempted to use the method of "mass hysteria" for expansion of their influence. This tendency was further promoted by Explo ‘74 in 1974; successive large-scale evangelism rallies held by Ministers Cho Youn-gi and Sin Hyong- gyun; the rally of one million people at the prayer service for the fatherland; and the great evangelism rally of the nation in 1977- all of which convinced the Church’s conservative leaders of the success of a mass event. This becomes an important clue for analyzing the characteristics of the Church since the 1970s, as well as before that period.

VII. Two Contrary Theological Views on the State and the Church

So far we have reviewed relations between the Church and the State from national liberation in 1945 until the early-1970s in view of the Church’s confrontation with the nation’s political powers. As we review this period of church history, we have come to understand that the Church, in general, established a relationship of adhesion with the political power of the Liberal Party regime in the 1950s that led to mutual support for both institutions, and we also witnessed the Korean church undergo a radical turning point in its life as it moved from a pro- government stance to a critical attitude in the 1960s under the Republican Party regime.

More analysis and studies are needed to determine how the pro- administration church in the 1950s turned to a critical power in the 1960s. Here, however, we are going to consider mainly the contradictory elements and transitional aspects within the Church as shown in the process of change in the Church’s characteristics.

The late-1960s in the life of the Christian community in Korea is a period characterized distinctly by disagreement over socio- political perspectives represented by the different trends of social participation and conservatism advocated by the Church.116 In other words, the confrontation of conservative and progressive views within the Church surfaced along with the conflict of the Korean church with the political power in the late-1960s. The basic inclinations of the Korean church since the 1970s, however, have been mainly humanization, democratization and social participation advocating equality and the elimination of poverty.

A conservative faction arose within the Church to oppose them, however, and a lot of confusion ensued in the social participation movement of the Korean church. The strategic actions that were organized by the conservative movement included: the national evangelism movement in 1966; the rally for national security and anti-communism and the Breakfast Prayer Meeting for the President, both beginning in 1968; the Billy Graham revival rally in 1972-1973; the great rally of Explo ‘74 in 1974; and the Declaration of Seoul in 1975. These movements were led by the Korean CCC headed by Minister Kim Chun-gon; the Korean Businessmen Association headed by presbyter Kim In-duk; the Central Gospel Church headed by Minister Cho Yong-gi; the Council of International Evangelism headed by Minister Cho Tong- jin; the East-West Evangelism Development and Research Center headed by Minister So Chae-jin; the Daehan Mission of Saving the Nation headed by Minister Choe Tae-min; the Korean Christian Anti-Communist Federation headed by Minister Kim Chun-gon; and other conservative churches.

The political views of the conservative faction exhibited largely two characteristics. The first is the adhesion of the conservative power to the political power; the second is their attempt to expand their own influence through large-scale rallies to divert the public’s attention to non-historic elements. The first characteristic is direct; the second characteristic is indirect, executed with full support from the government as counter-propaganda against criticism concerning its oppression of religion.

With this understanding and brief background about the political conservatism of the conservative faction of the Church, we will review the contrasting views about the relationship of the State and the Church as represented within the Korean church in the late-1960s.117

A. The Theology of Historical Participation118

Minister "Changgong" Kim Chaejun, a theologian who is considered to represent the Korean Christian view on social participation, analyzed the process of participation in reality as summarized below.

During the period of ideological confrontation with the Communists after national liberation, Changgong and his disciples undertook the role of defending democracy from a theological viewpoint. In the process of experiencing the April 19 and May 16 revolutions and the corruption and centralization of power of the Republican Party regime, however, Changgong must have gone through significant mental transitions and finally reached the conclusion that the realization of democracy was a duty more important than warding off communism, or perhaps it was the surest way to ward off communism.

When the Republican Party regime accelerated the Korea-Japan talks, Changgong was still not very interested in domestic politics; but after the Park regime’s policies towards Japan created distrust of the administration, Changgong began to closely watch the decline and atrocities of the ruling power, warning against them, and he began to assert that it was the responsibility of the Church to criticize those wrongdoings. As the atrocities towards the Church by the ruling power grew more intense with its demonstrations opposing the Korea-Japan agreements, the Church showed a tendency to shun frank opinions for the sake of safety. As a result, Changgong collected his comrades outside the Church and engaged in practical participation in the nation’s social reality during the revision of the Constitution to permit presidents to serve three terms119

In a way, however, Prof. Kim’s theology of participation in reality had been in the process of formulation already under the regime of the Republican Party. His successive theses show that the nucleus of his theological interest was participation in history. Representative of his theses was "The Matter of Participation in History and Our Existence," which was written in 1958 in the last years of the Republican Party regime. In this thesis, we can see that Prof. Kim had been cherishing the matter of participation in history at the center of his beliefs. He said, for instance, "Christianity basically has dual elements - God and people, afterlife and this world, commandments and thoughts, what belongs to God and what belongs to Caesar." A Christian leads a tense life between these extremes.

The Christianity that had been introduced to Korea, however, was mainly based on the orthodox system of theology. It was largely exclusive and anti-cultural. Therefore, Christianity, like Buddhism, created a means of escape separated from history; this was mistaken for Christian "holiness."120 We, however, cannot avoid historic reality, as Changgong notes:

"Everybody must become a character in the play. You have to

act out the way of the cross, standing in the center of the situation. That is what it means for a Christian to exist today.

"The proper attitude of a Christian towards history is that of criticizing the history of reality from the standpoint and qualifications of a person of redemption, guiding that history to the goal of salvation. A Christian should be prepared to bear the cross in this guidance and criticism.

"We believe we will be able to find a handful of human existence in a new form among the Korean people only when we build an expiating society by means of the innocence of the cross and let expiating ethics quietly seep into the herd of sin".121

And while discussing "The Historic Significance of the Korean Presbyterian Church" in 1956, he clarified his opinion about the practical participation in history of the Korean church:

"Now this Korea is our assignment. From God, we are given the mission of building an expiating history within the history of Korea and transforming Korean history to the history of Christ’s heaven. ...As Christ abandoned the treasures of heaven to be physically born in human history for the salvation of that history and became a grain of wheat after shedding His blood to the last drop, Christians are given the [same] mission of dedicating their whole existence to faithfully following the example of Christ’s redemption instead of avoiding the history in which Christ has cast us.

"Therefore, we have to exert our efforts so that the spirit of Christ will be the basis [for life] in the various fields of politics economics, education and culture of this Korea given to us."122

Changgong also expressed his beliefs and passion for democracy in many other theses,123 but his theological views on the relationship between the State and the Church is most outspoken in his unpublished thesis about chaplains.’124 Changgong’s view of the State as shown in this thesis can be summarized as follows:

• First, the State should always exist. The State should exist not in the tragic negative sense that the existence of the State is necessitated be-cause there are criminal characters, but rather it should exist for effective management of the community even if criminality does not exist in humanity. A. Augustinus had the same opinion. He said the State exists for temporary order.

• Second, a Christian should assume a positive attitude towards the State that promotes order, for God’s Providence works within the State and through the State for the preservation of human life.

• Third, the State should remain within the limits provided to it. A Christian can never tolerate the State if it turns totalitarian and considers itself an absolute existence to be worshiped religiously. Christians cannot accept Nazism in Germany or the communist dictatorship in Russia because those states made themselves into an absolutely supreme being, refusing to be judged by a higher authority. In other words, the mythology of the State is a curse for the State itself and the enemy of the Church.

From this view of the State, Kim Chae-jun basically approved of the principle of separation. Kim Chaejun names three reasons for the separation of Church and State:

• First, it is the only way for the Church to secure its own freedom intact. If the State attempts to interfere with and ordain religion, that religion will perish.

• Second, separation can protect the Church from the State’s control. If the Church becomes superior, it will attempt to function as the State. The Catholic Church in the Middle Ages was actually a religious empire. Even if it cannot function as a whole state, the Church would ride on the power of the State and behave like a ruler instead of the server if the Church usurps the State’s responsibilities, which would also leave the State failing to function as a State in its true sense.

• Third, by separating the Church and the State, the Church will be a true Church. If the Church identifies itself too much with the State, it will become a government office; but this separation, according to Changgong, does not necessarily mean antagonism or indifference between the State and the Church.

Theoretically, the State should not interfere with the Church or its inner operations but should rather respect and guarantee the safety of the Church as well as humbly accept its advice. In other words, the State should be constantly reminded by the Church that it is governed by God’s authority, which is higher than the State itself.

Relating his theological beliefs to the country’s historical reality, Changgong urged the Korean government to assume a proper attitude towards the treaty and negotiations between Korea and Japan;125 he demonstrated strong opposition against the injustice of revising the Constitution;126 and he theologically analyzed and criticized the 1971 election.127 What was more important, however, was the fact that his theology of historical participation was carried out, not in the study and cell, but out in the middle of historic reality itself. He willingly took the office of chairman of the National Struggle Committee To Oppose the Constitutional Revision at the time of the constitutional controversy, and he worked as a member of the National Council for Defending Democracy during the 1971 presidential election. Changgong never considered it non- religious to struggle against corrupt politics, undemocratic social evils and the evil system: indeed, he declared before the 1967 election that it was the proper duty of a religious person.

Changgong himself theologically explains his own actions in that vein:

"Therefore, the actual performance of love through a system and organization is essential for the modern world, and political participation by religious people is a form of religious confession. ...Consequently, life should be recorded as a historic event in history for our faith to be a true faith."128

As Prof. Yu Tong-sik properly observed, the works of Changgong were his very participation in history, and his thoughts were formed quietly in the process of his participation in history.

B. Conservative Political Theology

Here we will review the views of Korean conservative political theologians, primarily those of Prof. Kim I-hwan. Basically Prof. Kim Ihwan’s conservative political theology was based on Calvinistic political theology as its theological foundation, like other conservative theologies. In interpreting Calvinistic political theology, however, he showed the clear tendency of primarily following the American fundamentalist theologians.

After the Yushin incident in October 1972, Prof. Kim I-hwan published his thesis "Political Participation by the Korean Church" in Sinhakjinam. In this writing, Prof. Kim I-hwan discussed the relationship of the Church and the State as summarized below.129

Both the Church and the State are divine governments with different purposes, and their function and domain are independent. In looking in retrospect at the short history of the Korean church, however, the Church has sometimes committed the mistake of seceding its own domain under the pretext of "patriqtism." The Church cannot interfere in political matters, that is, non-religious matters, under the name of the Church. The Korean church has already committed the error of confusing "what belongs to God" with "what belongs to Caesar."

He illustrated this point by explaining that political participation by the Church in the last days of the Chosun Dynasty was non-religious and that participation by the whole Church in the March 1 Movement was wrong. Revenge was taken against the Church not only for religious but also for political reasons because of the Church’s involvement in the March 1 Movement. Political participation under Japanese colonialism was carried out in close partnership with the nationalist movement, which was caused by a misled understanding of Christianity and a lack of sound theology.

Asserting that it was misguided for the whole Church to have participated in the March 1 Movement, Prof. Kim I-hwan said Christians cannot exclusively support the democratic political system alone. He said people have to obey the power above them, whether it be the power of the Roman Empire or any other empire. He concluded, therefore, that participation of the whole Church in the March 1 Movement had been a mistake 130

In this respect, Prof. Kim I-hwan insisted that the Church had erred when it released an opposing statement in the name of the Church during the Korea-Japan negotiations in 1965 and when it expressed opinions, both supporting and opposing, about the Yushin system in the name of the Church in 1972. He said that the Church must not be the greenhouse for democracy nor the command post for the civil rights movement. Thus, Prof. Kim I-hwan criticized the Church’s negative theoretical attitude about world reality, its detached holy attitude derived from it and its direct participation in political issues exhibited in its nationalistic inclinations during Japanese colonialism.131

According to Prof. Kim I-hwan, the Korean church should criticize its own methods of participation in reality.

First, the Korean church should assume a new evangelistic attitude so that God’s desires will be realized in the cultural and political fields according to the dogma of God’s sovereignty. Therefore, application of our faith must not be limited to religious life; Christ’s sovereignty should be expanded to include all aspects of life. The Korean church must strive to teach believers to simultaneously worship the God of Sunday and the God of Monday as well.

Second, in participating in reality, the Korean church should be discreet in its direct participation. What the Church can do for the world is perform the service of the Word, the service of salvation and offer prayers. The Church deviates from its given mission of service when it participates in the nation’s political realities in the name of the Church.

Prof. Kim I-hwan is conscious of the basic political ethics of Calvinistic theology, however, when he says, "The Church can make a direct statement in the name of the Church concerning political areas only when the matter of faith is infringed upon." Here arises the problem, for the Yushin system idolized an ideology and attempted to make one individual an absolute existence: Was the Church’s involvement a matter of non-religious participation that had no connection with the first commandment?

In other words, could the conservative church that had asserted its opposing views and desperately criticized ideological atheism, materialistic evaluations and idealization of a system of communism now generously tolerate the materialistic tendency of idolatry to make the Yushin political power absolute? Here one can detect ambiguity and a discriminating use of the clear Calvinistic theological principle of separation of politics and religion from political reality by the conservative church. As to the theoretical attitudes of the conservative theologians, such as those of Prof. Kim Ihwan who advocate a firm separation of politics and religion, they seem to maintain a strict separation of politics and religion as far as participation in political reality is concerned, and they offer sharp criticism toward the views of political participation that stand in opposition to their position. They are rather silent, however, about the political statements and actions by the faction of the Church to which they themselves belong.

One thing we should make clear now is that the viewpoint of Korean conservative theologians about political theology is not neutral or detached or transcending; they believe if a political power guarantees anti-communism, whatever way they seized and maintained power, the power of that regime is theologically sanctioned.

VIII. Conclusion: Creating a Healthy

Relationship between the State and the Church

The Korean people have gone through enormous historic missions and tribulations since 1945. With liberation, our nation had to establish a unified state, and it faced the tasks of establishing a nationalistic society, a human community burdened with common economic development, social reformation and alleviation of the national culture. These tasks had to be undertaken together by the State and the Church for the Korean national community. It is believed neither the State nor the Church alone could solve all of these problems. At this point, the Korean Constitution refused to make the State religious and turned it secular; thus, refusal to acknowledge a state religion. At the same time, the principle of separation of Church and State and freedom of faith was guaranteed. This provided the grounds for forbidding the State from infringing on the domain of faith; for if the State interferes in the spiritual, religious realm, it is an indirect form of turning the State into a religion as well as of denying the given role of religion itself.

In spite of this constitutional guarantee, the State and the Church continued to maintain a complex relationship of adhesion and tension. The tendency of the political power to turn non- democratic and for the state function to expand emerged during national crises, such as the division of the nation, the Korean War, successive dictatorships and the effects of rapid socio- economic transitions created by high-speed economic development. Rapid growth of the Korean church and its evangelistic function ensued. Therefore, the state power and religion have experienced many uncomfortable encounters. Thus far, we have tried to briefly discuss this relationship between the Church and the State.

Conclusions cannot be given here, but several points can be made.

i. The articles in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea pertaining to religion are based on the premise that the political power is operating in a democratic system. Therefore, the Korean Christian church will believe in the potentiality for the wholesome realization of religious freedom when the state power develops in democratic ways. Until then, the Church will incline towards democracy and express negative reactions to the political tendencies contrary to that. The Korean church seems to have followed this path since 1945.

ii. From the first days of its evangelism, the value of the Christian church, it has been thought, was recognized by the Korean people only when it deeply participated in the destiny of the nation. Fundamentally, the Korean Christian church is an imported religion whose historical identity was not always confirmed; but through its participation in history, the Church attempted to secure its place in Korean society. This concern overpowered both freedom and conservatism in theology.

iii. The Korean church positively asserts the expansion of the functions of state power. The Korean church positively acknowledges the State’s responsibility for security, for political progress and for economic development and social welfare. The Korean church though will assume the critical and prophetic role of asking the state power for justification, integrity and justice in carrying out those responsibilities.

iv. On the other hand, the Korean church believes that problems will arise if the state power interferes in religious, spiritual or moral matters of humanity that are caused by limitations placed on the Church’s power. Since state power is based on force, it possesses no religious, spiritual or moral capability for persuasion so it will fall into the self-contradiction of "hypocrisy" when it attempts that role. Naturally the politicians as individuals should accumulate spiritual, religious and moral riches, but the characteristics of political power cannot be categorized as spiritual or moral, not to say religious. These qualities should belong to the citizens themselves and their voluntary religious, educational and cultural activities. For their sake, freedom of the people must be guaranteed.

v. The role and value of Christian evangelism should be positively accepted in the social realm of the Korean nation. The Christian church will contribute to the national community by the realization of religious, evangelistic and theological beliefs, not only in religious, spiritual and moral "territory," but also in political, economic, social and cultural areas as well; and through this process, the role of Christianity will be fundamentally approved. Of course, these should be done within the legal limits and boundaries of the democratic political system.

vi. Recently uncomfortable experiences have at times taken place between the state power and the Christian church in the areas of education, the mass media, popular evangelism and social justice, but it is believed that these events can be resolved through dialog between the State and the Church. However, the Church will remain sensitive to the preservation and development of the democratic political system and will exert efforts to expand it, not only to the political, but also to the social dimension as well. The realization of Christian values is impossible outside the structure of democratic life, however, and acts of confrontation and repression will prevent church participation in Korean society.

We will try to prevent adhesion of the State and the Church or extreme confrontations for the sake of the development of Korean society. The state power and the Korean Christian church should maintain a continual relationship of creative cooperation and tension for the common goal of development of the national community.


1. In the Constitution, freedom of religion is guaranteed and so are religious activities as the Church and the State are separated. Clause 1, Article 19 of the Constitution states: "All the people are provided with freedom of religion." Clause 2: "National religion is not designated, and religion and State should be separated."

2. It is equivalent to 23.68% of the south Korean population of 38 million.

3. The royal proclamation to repeal Western religion was first issued in

1839 and again in 1866.

4. The Korea-France trade pact was signed in Seoul on June 4, 1886, between Kim Man-sik, the mayor of Seoul, and F. C. Cogordan of France.

5. Robert F. Speer, Missions and Politics in Asia (New York, 1898).

6. Reference to the New People’s Society is made by Paek Nak-jun in ‘Persecution of the Korean Church," Sinhak Nondan (Theological Theses), Vol. 7, 1962; and by Yi Chae-sun in "The New People’s Society and the Assassination Attempt of Governor-General Terauchi," Hyonsanggwa Insik (Phenomenon and Recognition), autumn edition.

7. Allen D. Clark, A History of the Church in Korea, pp. 190-196.

Kim Yang-son, "The Role and Contribution of the Christian Schools in the History of Korean Education," The Study of Korean Church History (Seoul: Kidokkyomunsa, 1971) pp. 355-382.

8. "Independence Outbreak" (data on the March 1 Movement), translated by Kim Yong-Bok and serialized in Christian Thought, beginning with the December 1979 issue.

9. C. Holton, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947).

10. Min Kyong-bae, The Korean Church History (Seoul: Kidokkyosohwe, 1976) p. 364.

11. Kim Yang-son, The Ten Years of Liberation of the Korean Church (Seoul: Educational Department, Presbyterian Church Headquarters, 1956) p. 46.

12. In December 1945, the federation of five provinces in north Korea established principles for reconstruction of the Korean church. The southern Presbyterian convention nullified the resolution to worship Shinto on August 12, 1946.

13. Ko Won-sop, Crimes of the Anti-National Activists (Paegyongmunhwasa, 1982) pp. 131-137.

14. The Church and the Society, Vol. 11, August 1986, pp. 1-3.

15. The Christian Al~nanac (The Council of Korean Christian Churches, 1972) p. 300.

16. According to the Calvinistic view of the State, a State, being included in the degraded order of Creation, can contribute in controlling the degraded condition of human beings but cannot influence the sublime levels of spirituality. This passive tradition, however, cannot provide the basis for the active religious attitude of participation in social activities. The view of the State in this tradition failed to overcome the passive Calvinistic view of the State.

17. "The Nationalization Bill for Japan’s Yaskuni Zinza and the Korean Church," The Third Day, May 1971. Chi Myong-gwan, "Struggle against Yaskuni Zinza," Christian Thought, April 1971.

18. The Council of Korean Christian Churches announced the statement denouncing Yaskuni Zinza reconstruction on June 8,1971. The Christian Almanac, loc. cit., p. 301.

19. The Third Day, loc. cit.

20. This figure differs from Kin Yang-son’s 300,000; Rhodes’ 350,000; and the National Unification Board’s 1.5 million, but the church historians’ judgment should be the most authentic. That figure is about 3% of the north Korean population of 9.4 million at the time.

21. Choe Kwang-sok, Religious Life in North Korea, July 1972, p. 179. It is said that 14,000 chong was confiscated from the religious organizations.

22. Kim Yang-son, op. cit., pp.65-67. The History of Anti-Communist Struggle in North Korea (compiled by the Society for Promoting Korean Unification, 1971) p. 178.

23. Kim Yang-son, op. cit., p.67 and on.

24. Kim Yang-son, Ibid.. p. 68.

25. Kim Chang-mun and Chong Chae-son, Past and Present of Korean Catholicism. pp. 491-521.

26. Ibid., p. 364.

Among the arrested were Kim Pil-hyon, Choe Hang-jun. Pak Yun-ok, So Un-sok, Yi Chae-ho and Chang Tu-bong, and 15 priests in Pyongyang disappeared.

27. Activated on November 28,1946, the federation at first demanded only that the clergy join it; but by 1948, lay believers were also forced to join the organization. Thus, they organized the unit functions based on counties and provinces, and the Christian Federation Convention was formed in 1949 comprising the provincial representatives. Against their will, the convention appointed Minister Kim Ik-tu as the chairman, Minister Kim Ungsun as vice chairman and Minister Cho Taek-su as the secretary.

28. Kim Yang-son, op. cit., p. 70.

29. O Che-do, "Anti-Communist Uprising by the Siniju Students," National Unification, December 1973, pp. 162-167.

30. The History of Anti-Communist Struggle in North Korea, bc. cit., pp. 93-100.

31. Ibid., pp. 218-233.

32. The Christian Youth Encouragement Rally was held at the Songmunbak Church in Pyongyang on February 17, 1946, to fight against atheism and communism, and a demonstration ensued. Again, on April 7,1946, the West Church at Chaeryong held the Christian Youth Encouragement Rally in Hwanghaedo attended by about 2,000 people, which is known to be the last popular youth rally in north Korea.

33. More detailed information can be found on pages 88-90 of The Ten Years of Liberation of the Korean Church by Kim Yang-son.

34. Kidok Sinmun, May 31,1948, and The Church and the Society, July, 1986, p. 6. From the U.S. military administration to the Liberal Party administration, about 10% of the personnel in the government and various central offices were Christians, according to Om Yo-sop.

35. Kidok Sinmun, August 15, 1948.

36. Kidok Sinmun, June 25, 1952.

37. Kidok Sinmun, August 4, 1952.

38. "Campaign Committees Organized for Respective Electoral Districts," Kidok Sinmun, March 8, 1954.

Om Yo-sop criticized the fact that the Christian community was divided into three factions supporting different vice presidential candidates in the election of the second president of the republic. One faction was the Methodist Church and the refugee poets from north Korea, who supported Minister Yi Tun- yong; the second faction was the Sinminhak group of the Korean Theological Seminary, who supported Minister Ham Tae-yong; and the third faction was the orthodox conservative theologians supporting Yi Kang-song. The Church and the Society, September 1986, pp. 15-17.

39. Kidok Sinmun, May 30, 1954.

Among the 203 elected members, 12 from the Liberal Party (LP), three from the Minguk Party (MP), one from the National Party (NP) and three unaffiliated to any party were Christians.

They were: Yi Ki-bung (LP, former defense minister); Yun Song-sun (LP, former transportation minister); Chong Ki-won (LP, Rep.); Name Songhak (LP, Rep.); Kang Kyong-ok (LP, Rep.); Pak Yong-chun (LP, Rep.); Hwang Song-su (LP, Rep.); Pak Sun-sok (LP, minister); Hong U-born (LP, director of the Police Bureau); Kim Chun-ho (LP, businessman); Kim Yongsam (LP, secretary to the prime minister); Kim Chol-ju (LP, county chief); Kim To-yon (MP, former finance minister); Yun Po-son (MP, former minister of commerce); Kim Sang-don (MP, member of the Constitutional Assembly); Yun Chi- yong (NP, vice chairman of the National Assembly); Chong Il-gyong (unaffiliated, Rep.); Chong Chun (unaffiliated, member of the Constitutional Assembly); Kim Yong-son (unaffiliated, Rep.).

40. The Christian Bulletin, March 1, 1960.

41. The Christian Bulbetin, December 24, 1956.

42. When a person by the name of Kastler, an American, was caught smuggling 1,694 wristwatches into the country at Yoido Airport on November 9, 1956, the investigation disclosed that "Macario Chang" was involved in the case. Both of them were engaging in sly smuggling operations in coordination with Vice Chairman Hwang Song-su and Rep. Pak Yong-chul, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the National Assembly. Rep. Pak Yong-chul was further suspected of having earlier helped delay deportation of Macario Chang, who had been ordered to leave the country in connection with a smuggling incident. Thus, he assisted Chang in his covert operation as well as smuggling watches himself into Korea in his personal effects on his way back from Hong Kong as an envoy. The police investigation determined that Rep. Hwang Song-su was innocent, but he resigned from the post of vice chairman of the assembly while Rep. Pak Yong-chul was sentenced to six months in prison by the Supreme Court on January 14,1958.

43. Om Yo-sop, "The Liberal Party and the Christians," The Church and the Society, August 1986, pp. 1-3.

Minister Om Yo-sop, who published the Christian magazine The Church and the Society dealing with current issues in the temporary capital city of Pusan during the Korean War, analyzed the power structure within the Liberal Party in his essay and commented on the Christian Assemblymen and their attitudes.

44. Kim Chae-jun, "Participation in Democracy and Mission of the Korean Church," Christian Thought, June 1960.

45. Kim Kyong-jae, loc. cit., pp. 114-115.

46. Chang Ha-gu; "Revolution and Reflection on the Church," Christian Thought, May 1962, pp. 37- 43.

47. The statement by the Youth Society of Saemunan Church entitled "The Conspicuous Anti-Revolutionary Force - The Church Calendar Is Still April 18" caused a controversy and demands were made to punish the involved youth. The Christian Newspaper, December 10, 1960. This incident was ignited by "the statement for Church purification" by young believers of Saemunan Church in May 1960.

48. Kim Chae-jun, "The Korean Church after the April 19 Revolution," Christian Thought, April 1961, p. 145.

49. Ibid., p. 149.

50. The Christian Newspaper, February 16, 1964.

51. The Christian Newspaper, September 4, 1964.

52. The Korean Christian Archives (The Korean Christian Almanac, 1967) pp. 483-484.

53. Ibid., pp. 490-493.

54. The Christian Newspaper, July 16, 1965.

55. The Christian Newspaper. July 2-9, 1965.

56. The Christian Newspaper, July 29, 1965.

57. The Christian Newspaper, August 21, 1965.

58. The Christian Newspaper, December 16, 1963.

59. The Christian Newspaper, June 26, 1965.

The following materials are available in reference to the criticism made by the Christian community: Pak Hyong-gyu, "Where Is the Freedom of Religion? The Meaning of the Bill for Revision of the Law Pertaining to the Registration of Organizations," Sasanggye, January 1966; Han Tong-sop, "On the Registration Law for Social Organizations - Application to the New Additional Ot~ganizations," The Religious World, March 1966.

60. The Christian Newspaper, June 18, 1965.

61. The Christian Newspaper, November 27, 1965, and The Christian Bulletin, November 27, 1965.

62. The recommendation was carried in The Christian Bulletin, November 27, 1965.

63. Ibid.

64. The Christian Bulletin, December 4, 1965.

65. The Christian Bulletin, December 18, 1965.

66. The Christian Newspaper, January 29, 1966.

67. The Christian Newspaper, June 24, 1967.

68. Ibid.

69. Kim Chaejun, "Struggle against Injustice Is also a Religion," Sasanggye, July 1967, p. 17.

70. The Christian Newspaper, March 5, 1969.

71. These Christian leaders involved with the National Struggle Committee joined the Christian Yomgwanghwe. On August 12,1969, Yomgwanghwe delivered a statement that said, "We have devoted ourselves for years to struggle and challenge to eliminate social evils, and even now we are sharply aware of our mission. That is why at this moment we are delivering God’s will. Immediately withdraw...the constitutional amendment and redeem the punished students." Electing Chong Il-hyong as chairman; Ham Sok-hon, Kim Chae-jun, Kim Sang-don and Yun Po-son as advisors; and Pak Hyong-gyu, Mun Ok-tae, Mun Chang-sik and Mm Sung as executives, they expanded their organization and continued their campaign against the amendment.

72. The Chosun Ilbo, September 4, 1969.

73. The Chosun Ilbo, September 5, 1969.

74. Kim Kwan-suk, "The Motive and Purpose of Convening the National Struggle Committee," Report of the National Struggle Committee (National Council of Churches, 1977) pp. 19-20.

75. Pak Hyong-gyu, "Let Us Seek a Brighter Korea," Christian Thought, October 1969, p. 23.

76. The Christian Council of Churches expressed their support for the July 4 South-North Korean Joint Communique on July18, 1972. The Church Yonhap Sinmun, July 23, 1972.

77. Han Kyong-jik et al., "The Christian View of the July 4 Joint Communique," Monthly Christian Radio, Vol. 13, July 8, 1972.

78. Paek Nak-jun et al., "The Christian Leaders’ Seminar on the July 4 Joint Communique," Monthly Christian Radio, Vol. 13, July 8, 1972.

79. Mun Ik-hwan, "National Unification and the Korean Church," Christian Thought, October 1972.

80. Pak Hyong-gyu, "Gospel of Understanding and the South-North Dialog," The Third Day, Vol. 13, September 1971.

The minister made this prophetic statement before the July 4 communique, and his opinion was later shared by other Christian leaders.

81. Kang Won-yong, "National Unification and Our Mission," Christian Thought, February 1961; Kim Sok-chan, "National Unification and Our Mission," Christian Thought, March 1961; Han Chol-ha, "National Unification and Church Strategy," Christian Thought, December 1970; Mun 1k-hwan, "National Unification and the Korean Church," Christian Thought, October 1972; Han Chol-ha, "Encounter of You and I, and Communication of South and North," Christian Thought, October 1972. The above materials can be consulted as further reference sources.

82. Kang Won-yong, bc. cit., pp. 4247.

83. Park Sang jung, "National Unification for Our Life," Christian Thought, February 1961, pp. 48-55.

84. Kim Sok-chan, lx. cit., pp. 48-55.

85. Kim Kwan-suk, "The Church and National Unification," Christian Thought, December 1970.

86. Han Chol-ha, lx. cit., pp. 45-53.

87. Chu Chae-yong, "The Unification Theory of the Korean Church," Christian Thought, June 1981, pp. 3748.

88. Examples include the self-immolation of Chon Tae-il, a laborer working at Pyonghwa Market, on November 3,1970; the riot at the Songnam housing land development project in 1971; and the Korean Airlines Building incident in 1971.

89. Kim Kyong-je, ‘The Church and People’s Movement in the Age of Division," Nationalism and the Church (Seoul: Minjungsa, 1981).

According to Prof. Kim Kyong-je, the constitutional revision for a third presidential term proposed in 1969 and solidification of the Yushin system in 1972 were clearly carried out with the intention of changing the basic Constitution to allow Park Chung- hee to remain in power for a prolonged period of time.

90. The Christian Almanac, loc. cit., p. 302.

This rally was held on October 8, 1971. The Korean Student Christian Federation (KSCF) and the students of Hansin Theological Seminary released statements denouncing corruption and injustice on October 16, and Catholics and Protestants demonstrated in Wonju, Seoul and Taegu on October 17 demanding termination of political corruption. On October 26, the Korean Presbyterian Church released a statement by the church and society committee commenting on the campus unrest; supporting the validity of the demand for elimination of political corruption; and urging the lifting of the Garrison Decree and the orders to close the schools.

91. The petition campaign for signatures against the constitutional revision was regulated by Presidential Emergency Measures No.1 and 2 in January 1974. The National Democratic Young Student Confederation incident was regulated by Presidential Emergency Measure No.4 on April 3, 1974, and troops were stationed on the Korea University campus under the authorization of Presidential Emergency Measure No. 7 on April 8, 1975. Presidential Emergency Measure No.9 was proclaimed on May 13, 1975.

92. Eight years of imprisonment was sought for Minister Un Myong-gi, but he was sentenced to two years of probation on November 14, 1973.

93. Minister Pak Hyong-gyu, evangelists and students took part. The Christian community was upset as Minister Pak was arrested and indicted on charges of conspiracy for treason. He was sentenced to two years of imprisonment and was released on September 27, 1973, on bail.

94. "The Declaration of Human Rights" released by the Korean National Council of Churches on July 23,1973, became a milestone for the Christian human rights movement in the 1970s. The Korean Presbyterian Church had already delivered "The Guidelines for Social Proclamation" on September 24,1973; "The 1973 Declaration of the Korean Christians" had been released on May 20, 1973, in the name of the Korean Christian clergy; and 66 Korean theologians and Christian leaders had signed "The Theological Proclamation of the Korean Christians" in November 1974.

95. These young ministers were sentenced from 10 to 15 years in prison in 1973.

96. The Democratic Youth Federation incident on April 3,1974, was ignited when religious and academic personages and students exchanged their opinions on the restoration of democracy. More than 200 of the 1,024 people that had been investigated were arrested and indicted on charges of violating the State Security Law, the Presidential Emergency Measure and conspiracy for treason. Their sentences ranged from five years of imprisonment to the death penalty.

97. Criticism of the government at the training convention of the Chollapukto Regional Youth Council of the Presbyterian Church on July 7,1975, and at the annual convention of the First Chonbuk local branch of the Democratic Unification Party led to his arrest on suspicion of violating the Anti- Communism Law. He was sentenced at the Supreme Court to 10 years in prison and seven years suspension of his office.

98. On March 9-15,1979, six executive secretaries of the Christian Academy - Yi U-je, Han Myong-suk, Sin In-ryong, Kim Se-gyun, Hwang Han-sik, Chang Sang-hwan and Prof. Chong Chang-yol of Hanyang University -were taken for interrogation. On April16, they were arrested on suspicion of reading seditious publications, organizing pro-communist activities and including anti-government materials in their mass education program for workers and farmers.

99. The accusation of pro-communist inclinations in the urban industrial evangelism mission was most distinctly and openly displayed in the arguments concerning the Dongil Textile Co. incident and the YH workers riot on August 11, 1979.

100. Kim Kwan-suk, the executive secretary, was arrested and indicted on charges of diversion of the evangelism fund sent by the German church relief organization Bread for the World to support evangelism activities in Korean urban areas and slums. Three other ministers were also suspected. The representative of the German church relief organization testified in court, however, that the fund had been used appropriately, but the prosecution and the court sentenced them to prison. This was apparently a political trial executed for the purpose of undermining the activities and special evangelism of the National Council of Churches.

101. Twelve Christian professors from Hankuk Theological Seminary, Yonsei University and Korea University were dismissed in May and June 1975.

102. The Private School Law passed the Standing Committee of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction on June 5,1963. It contained a total of 74 articles and four supplementary clauses.

103. The Christian Bulletin, July 15, 1963.

104. The Christian Bulletin, November 24, 1968.

105. The Christian Bulletin, April 12, 1970.

106. The Christian Bulletin, April 21, 1973.

107. Ibid.

108. The Christian Bulletin, August 25, 1973.

109. The Christian Bulletin, September 29, 1973.

110. The Church Yonhap Newspaper, July 4, 1976.

111. The Church Yonhap Newspaper, August 26, 1977.

112. The Church Yonhap Newspaper, August 27, 1978.

113. The Gospel Sinbo, March 1968.

114. No Hong-sop, "The Breakfast Prayer Meeting Should Be Stopped," Sasanggye, April 1966, pp.77-80.

Kim I-tae, "A Certain Breakfast Prayer Meeting," The Gospel Sinbo, November 25, 1979.

115. For instance, at the sixth Breakfast Prayer Meeting for the President in May 1973 held immediately after the Yushin proclamation, Minister Kim Chun-gon delivered a sermon supporting the Yushin system; and at the seventh Breakfast Prayer Meeting for the President in 1974, Minister Yi Sang-ro, former chairman of Daehan Presbyterian Church, said in his sermon: "When religion and politics help and cooperate and harmonize with each other, religion becomes sacred and the State will prosper without any unrest." President Park sent Minister Yi a message that said, "The Communists in north Korea are trying to infiltrate the religious community as a part of their strategy to establish the Unification Front so the religious leaders should be alert," thus, giving the impression that the conservative power and the Yushin political power were reinforcing each other.

116. References for conservative and progressive theological opinions advocated by the Church are found in the following materials: Chu Cheyong, "The Korean Progressive Theology," Christian Thought, January 1978; Kim Yong-hak, "Criticism of Korean Liberal Theology," Christian Thought, November 1977.

117. Reference for political activities by the conservative faction of the Korean church in the 1970s can be found in the unpublished Korean Student Christian Federation (KSCF) research report "The Aspects of Political Conservatism of the Korean Conservative Church."

118. Prof. Kim Chae-jun expressed his theological viewpoint in his thesis "The Theology of Historical Participation," The Third Day, July 1971. Reference materials about Prof. Kim Chae-jun include: Prof. Chon Kyong-yon, "On Kim Chae-jun," Sasanggye, April1966; Prof. Yu Tong-sik, "The Flow of Korean Theology No. 7: Kim Chae-jun," Christian Thought, July 1968; and Prof. Kim Chong-jun, "On Dr. Kim Chae-jun," The Study of Theology, Vol. 13, 1972.

119. Pak Hyong-gyu, "The Elderly Minister’s Resolute Participation in Social Reality: On Minister Kim Chae- jun," Monthly Joongang, December 1971.

120. Kim Chae-jun, "The Matter of Participation in History and Our Existence," Christian Thought, March 1958.

121. Ibid., p. 70.

122. Kim Chae-jun, "The Historic Significance of the Korean Presbyterian Church," The Complete Works of Changgong Kim Chae-jun, Vol. 1 (Seoul: Committee of Changgong Works Publication, 1971) p. 120.

123. For example, some of Changgong’s writings that show his ceaseless interest in realistic social problems of historic reality include: "On Democracy," Sasanggye, May 1953; "Korea - for Democracy," The Third Day, January 1971; "Democratic Principles Should Be Respected," unpublished; "Democracy Cannot Be Avoided," The Third Day, September 1970; ‘Democracy Starts from Home," The Third Day, October 1970; "Evangelism and Nationalism," The Third Day, March 1971; "The Democratic Movement and the Korean Church," The Third Day, June 1971.

124. "Separation of Politics and Religion, and the Chaplain’s Role," The Complete Works of Changgong Kim Chae-jun, Vol. 1 (Seoul: Committee of Changgong Works Publication, 1971) pp. 484- 488.

It can be said that the theological basis for his view of participation in historic reality is already solidified, professed and prophesied in his lecture entitled "The Christian Spirit of the National Foundation - The Supreme Ideal and Reality of the Establishment of the State," which was delivered at the Solin Brotherhood rally in August 1945. Kim Kyong-je, loc. cit.

125. Kim Chae-jun, "Signing of the Korea-Japan Agreement and the Attitude of the Christians," The Presbyters Circular, August 1965.

126. Kim Chae-jun, "My Opinion on the Constitutional Revision," Christian Thought, July 1969.

127. Kim Chae-jun, "Struggle against Injustice Is also a Religion," Sasanggye, July 1967.

128. Kim Chong-jun, "On Changgong Kim Chae-jun," The Theological Studies, Vol. 13, 1972, p. 298.

129. Kim I-hwan, "Political Participation by the Korean Church," Sinhakjinam, March 1973, pp. 25-32. The same thesis is also carried in Kondae Hakbo, February 1973.

130. Ibid., pp. 29-31.

131. Kim I-hwan, "Christianity and Participation in Reality," Sinhakjinam, June 1973, pp. 6-7; Kim I-hwan, "The Church and the State," Sinhakjinam, September 1974, p. 7.


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